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lAUGHING AT TREATIES 
Carlos Manuel Vazquez* 
Professor Vazquez argues in this Response that constitutional text, doc-
trine, and structure-to say nothing of the Founders' intent-rule out Pro-
fessor Yoo :S claim that all ar most treaties categorically ar presumptively lack 
the force of domestic law and thus, unless implemented by statute, can be 
disregarded by citizens, the courts, and other officials responsible far enforc-
ing domestic law. The text of the Supremacy Clause plainly gives all United 
States treaties, if valid and in farce, the status of domestic law. The cases 
recognizing some treaties as non-self-executing fully support a presumption 
that treaties are self-executing and hence judicially enforceable in the absence 
of statutory implementation. Finally, Professor Yoo's structural arguments 
are either implausible ar too general to yield any particular conclusions on 
the question of the status of treaties as domestic law. 
lNTR.onucnoN 
Though ambitious in length and scope, "Globalism and the Constitu-
tion: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding"1 is 
modest in aim. Professor Yoo examines British and colonial approaches 
to treatymaking and enforcement, the experience under the Articles of 
Confederation, and the debates at the Constitutional Convention and 
some state ratifying conventions, and argues that this material does not 
provide "conclusive" or "definitive"2 support for the position that, under 
our Constitution, treaties "automatically" take effect as "the internal law 
of the United States" once made.3 Some of this material, he argues, in-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Daniel 
Ernst, Martin Flaherty, Vicki Jackson, and Mark Tushnet for their valuable comments and 
to Peter Klason for excellent research assistance. 
1. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism]. 
2. Id. at 1962, 2099. 
3. Id. at 1976. Professor Yoo dubs this the "internationalist" position-a label that, in 
my view, conveys the unwarranted impression that the defenders of this position are 
making normative or policy arguments to advance a position they favor on ideological 
grounds. Professor Yoo reinforces that impression in his descriptions of the 
"internationalist model" and the project of its adherents. See, e.g., id. (internationalists 
claim that "international agreements and law ought to be directly merged into the domestic 
legal system") (emphasis added); id. ("[T]he internationalist model argues that 
international agreements and international law should take effect directly as domestic law 
without any intervening legislative action.") (emphasis added); id. at 1977 (suggesting that 
internationalists are engaged in "[a]dvocacy of self-execution"). To the contrary, the 
defenders of this view have relied on fairly conventional modalities of constitutional 
argument, primarily argument based on text, history, and doctrine. I shall refer to what 
Professor Yoo calls the "internationalist" view as the "prevailing" understanding regarding 
the status of treaties as domestic law in the United States. 
I do not criticize Professor Yoo for himself relying on purely normative or policy 
arguments. See, e.g., id. at 2093 ("Non-self-execution responds to globalization by 
enhancing democratic safeguards .... "); see also the title of his article. To the extent that 
2154 
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stead supports the position that all or most treaties lack the force of do-
mestic law, and can thus be disregarded by citizens, the courts, and other 
officials (state and federal) responsible for enforcing domestic law.4 He 
hopes that, by clearing away this inconclusive underbrush, his work will 
"shift the debate on treaty execution toward textual, structural, or doctri-
nal arguments. "5 
Professor Flaherty has convincingly shown that Professor Yoo falls far 
short of even this modest goal.6 Indeed, as Professor Flaherty's Response 
demonstrates, a comprehensive examination of the founding material 
confirms the constitutional interpretation Professor Yoo attempts to dis-
credit. Because the prevailing view emerges from Professor Yoo's histori-
cal mill unscathed, I take this opportunity to engage in the sorts of analy-
ses Professor Yoo thinks potentially more decisive. Although the 
conclusion of "Globalism" indicates that the article's purpose was not to 
advance a textual, doctrinal, or structural defense of any particular posi-
tion concerning the status of treaties as domestic law under our Constitu-
text, history, and doctrine are inconclusive, it may well be appropriate to defend a 
constitutional interpretation on the basis of the types of arguments one would make in 
drafting a constitution from scratch. Cf. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic 
Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 310, 311-13 (1992) (analyzing policies 
that would be advanced and hindered by alternative constitutional rules on domestic status 
of treaties). Defenders of the prevailing view, however, do not regard text, history, or 
structure as inconclusive. 
The "internationalist" label also misleadingly suggests that the defenders of the 
prevailing view seek to encourage international commitments on the part of the United 
States. To the contrary, the prevailing view is designed to deter the treatymakers from 
entering into treaties lightly. It is Professor Yoo's view which, by diminishing the 
significance of a treaty's ratification, would encourage the promiscuous conclusion of 
international treaties. Gouverneur Morris recognized this at the Constitutional 
Convention, see infra text accompanying note 20, and Professor Yoo himself appears to 
acknowledge the point. See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and 
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218, 2231 (1999) 
[hereinafterYoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking]. 
I also note that the scholars Professor Yoo critiques do not agree in all respects. In 
describing my own position on the issues Professor Yoo discusses, I emphatically do not 
purport to speak for the other scholars Professor Yoo identifies as "internationalists." 
Perhaps the biggest point of disagreement among us concerns my acceptance of the 
treatymakers' power to deny a treaty domestic legal force through a clear statement in the 
body of the treaty or in a reservation. See infra text accompanying notes 123-135. What 
we have in common, I think, is that we all agree that the Supremacy Clause establishes at 
least a presumption that valid treaties in force have the status of domestic law in the United 
States. This is what I refer to as the "prevailing view." 
4. That this is the position Professor Yoo espouses is made clear in his Rejoinder, most 
starkly in his use of a quotation from Frederick Maitland, to which the title of this article 
alludes. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2227. My responses to 
the arguments raised in the Rejoinder are found primarily in the Coda. See infra text 
accompanying note 210-266. 
5. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2094. 
6. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original 
Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095 
(I999). 
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tion, Professor Yoo says enough about text, doctrine, and structure to 
justify a preliminary response. 1 explain in this Response why the read-
ings of the Supremacy Clause that Professor Yoo finds plausible in light of 
the founding material are implausible from the textual and doctrinal 
standpoints. I also explain why the structural critique Professor Yoo of. 
fers of the prevailing view misses its mark. This examination shows that, 
even if Professor Yoo had succeeded in demonstrating the inconclusive-
ness of the founding material, the other modalities of constitutional argu-
ment would provide more than ample support for the constitutional in-
terpretation Professor Yoo disputes. 
Before turning to text, doctrine, and structure, however, I shall com-
ment briefly on the type of argument that consumes by fur the greatest 
portion of Professor Yoo's article-his historical argument. Because this 
is the focus of Professor Flaherty's Response, I resist the temptation to 
explain how Professor Yoo misinterprets or overreads specific statements 
upon which he relies.7 Instead, I identify some fundamental problems 
with the interpretive theory that appears to underlie the structure of Pro-
fessor Yoo's historical exposition, as well as his critique of the use of the 
historical material by defenders of the prevailing view. I call Yoo's theory 
the "contractual theory" of original intent because it appears to regard as 
binding certain agreements reached at certain ratifying conventions re-
garding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Constitution. Part 
I describes the theory and explains why it would hold little promise in 
interpreting a constitutional provision like the Supremacy Clause, even if 
the statements upon which Professor Yoo relies as support for his inter-
pretation were more conclusive than he finds them in the end. 
That constitutional text and doctrine offer no firmer ground than 
history for rejecting the interpretation of the Supremacy Clause that 
prevails among scholars should come as no surprise. Contrary to Profes-
sor Yoo's suggestions, not all of the scholars who take this viewS rely pri-
marily on the founding materials. In my view, the position Professor Yoo 
disputes is supported most strongly by the text of the Constitution. Con-
cluding that the Constitution gives treaties, once made, "automatic" effect 
7. To the extent I have succumbed to the temptation, I have confined my discussions 
to footnotes. My discussion of specific statements should not be interpreted as agreement 
with Professor Yoo's interpretations of other statements. 
8. See generally Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 
198-204 (2d eel. 1996); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 760 
(1988). My contributions to this literature are Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines 
of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 695, 697-700 (1995) [hereinafter Vazquez, 
Four Doctrines]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The "Self-Executing" Character of the Refugee 
Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 Geo. Immigr. LJ. 39, 44-49 (1993) [hereinafter 
Vazquez, Se.lf:.Executing Character]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and 
Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1101-10 (1992) [hereinafter Vazquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights]. Hereinafter, I shall discuss primarily my own positions on the issues 
Yoo discusses. I shall refer to the writings of other scholars where appropriate, but mostly 
to explain how our positions appear to diverge. 
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as domestic law requires only a reading of the Supremacy Clause, which 
declares "all" treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land."9 I consider in 
Part II whether there are plausible ways to reconcile Professor Yoo's vari-
ous alternative positions with the Constitution's text. I conclude that 
there are not. 
I tum in Part III to judicial doctrine. Professor Yoo places much 
weight on judicial decisions recognizing a category of treaty that is not 
judicially enforceable because "non-self-executing." I regard this as the 
strongest support for Professor Yoo's position. Many courts and com-
mentators (including Yoo) take the position that a non-self-executing 
treaty lacks the force of domestic law.10 If so, then the cases recognizing 
a category of non-self-executing treaties are incompatible with a literal 
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, as they recognize that not "all" 
treaties of the United States are the law of the land. I have attempted to 
show that the conflict between the cases and the text is less severe than it 
at first appears, but I acknowledge that some tension remains. 
This tension, however, merely raises the question whether the text or 
the cases must give way. Answering the question requires a theory about 
the relative weight to be given to text and precedent in interpreting the 
Constitution. Some strict textualists take the position that the whole doc-
trine of non-self-execution is invalid because it conflicts with the 
Supremacy Oause.U The approach to constitutional interpretation I 
have followed accepts a greater, though limited, role for judicial prece-
dent that deviates from the text. But my approach strives to preserve as 
much of both text and doctrine as possible, reading both in such a way as 
to minimize the conflict.12 The Supreme Court cases ProfessorYoo cites 
9. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). 
10. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1978-79; United States v. Postal, 589 
F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. 
Tex. 1980); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 111 
cmt. h, reporter's note 5 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]; Henkin, supra note 8 
at 203-04;J.W. Peltason, Corwin and Peltason's Understanding the Constitution 114-115 
(6th ed. 1973); Alona E. Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 45 
Am. Soc'y lnt'l L. Proc. 66, 68 (1951);John H. Jackson, United States, in 7 The Effect of 
Treaties in Domestic Law 141, 145-46 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987); 
Geoffrey R Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 Ohio St. LJ. 781, 831 (1994). Compare Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (stating that "[t]he 
Convention is a self-executing treaty .... [Thus] no domestic legislation is required to give 
[it] the force of law in the United States"), with United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 
655, 667 (1992) (suggesting that a treaty's self-executing character and its status as "Law of 
the Land" are separate questions). 
11. See Paust, supra note 8, at 782-83. 
12. The approach I have followed resembles that elaborated by Richard Fallon in A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 
(1987). See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1114 n.126. For related 
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thus lead me to read the Supremacy Clause as adopting a default rule 
that treaties have the force of domestic law, a rule that may be reversed by 
the treatymakers through a clear statement in the treaty itself (or reserva-
tion thereto). This view is tolerably consistent with the Constitution's 
text. By contrast, Professor Yoo's view that treaties are not the law of the 
land unless implemented by statute is in intolerable conflict with the text. 
I address in Part IV a type of constitutional argument to which Pro-
fessor Yoo often resorts-an argument based on what he sees as the 
"deeper structural imperatives" of the Constitution.13 By this he appar-
ently means the separation-of-powers principles that give the "political 
branches" -the President and Congress-and not the courts, the respon-
sibility for conducting the nation's foreign policy. At the general and 
abstract level at which Professor Yoo most often deploys them, these argu-
ments are wholly inconclusive. They offer no basis for rejecting the pre-
vailing interpretation of specific separation-of-powers provisions of the 
Constitution, such as the Supremacy Clause, which expressly gives judges 
a role to play in the enforcement of treaties. 
I conclude with some comments on the larger project of unsettling 
legal doctrine. 
I. Yoo AND THE FoUNDING 
The great bulk of Professor Yoo's historical analysis is remarkably 
consistent with the conventional account. Although the defenders of the 
prevailing view might dispute some nuances of Professor Yoo's narrative, 
I, for one, have not doubted that the British distinguished sharply be-
tween treaties and laws, or that treaties in Great Britain lacked the force 
of domestic law unless implemented by Parliament.14 Nor have I 
approaches, see Phillip Bobbit, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982); 
Phillip Bobbit, Constitutional Interpretation (1991); Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 
(1996). 
13. Yoo, Globalism, supra note I, at 1982. 
14. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698. Professor Flaherty does 
question the claim that, under the British system that prevailed at the time of the 
Founding, treaties lacked the force of domestic law until implemented by Parliament. See 
Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2108-10. I will not attempt here to defend my position on this 
issue (and Yoo's) as a description of actual British practice at the time. 1t is enough for me 
that some (perhaps most) Founders so understood the British approach and attributed the 
failure of state courts to enforce the peace treaty to those courts' understanding that state 
statutes prevailed over inconsistent treaty obligations. The Convention debates show that 
at least some Founders understood the British rule to be as I have described it. For the 
propositions that this was the prevailing understanding, that the states' violations of 
treaties resulted from their adherence to some version of the British rule, and that the 
Supremacy Clause was adopted to "obviate this difficulty," I have relied primarily on the 
writings of roughly contemporaneous commentators, Jnstice Iredell in Ware v. Hylton, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) and Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States (1833). See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698-99. I recognize 
that some Founders questioned whether the British rule was in fact as I have described it. 
See Debate at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 3, 1787), in 2 The 
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doubted that violations of treaties by the states were a major problem 
during the period of the Articles of Confederation, or that the Articles 
were widely perceived to be flawed because they did not provide for the 
enforcement of treaties against the states. Indeed, I have noted that this 
was a key reason for the Framers' decision to draft a new Constitution. As 
I have explained elsewhere, the state courts failed to enforce treaties dur-
ing this period because, adhering to the British rule, they understood 
that treaties were not enforceable in court without legislative 
implementation. IS 
Professor Yoo's disagreement with the conventional account con-
cerns the mechanism adopted by our Constitution to address this funda-
mental problem. The prevailing view has been that the Founders ad-
dressed the problem in the Supremacy Clause by rejecting the British 
rule and adopting a different principle for the United States. Professor 
Yoo argues that the Constitution instead perpetuated the British rule that 
treaties lack domestic legal force without legislative implementation. 
Although the Constitution denies the House of Representatives a role in 
the making of treaties, Professor Yoo argues that it gives the House the 
power to determine whether treaties made shall have the force of domes-
tic law, and thus whether they will be complied with or violated. The 
Founders gave the House this power, Professor Yoo argues, to ensure 
"that the legislature maintained sufficient checks on executive power"l6 
and that the most representative part of the legislature would "retain the 
power to choose how or whether to implement the nation's international 
obligations."l7 
Professor Yoo claims some support in the Framing Debates in Phila-
delphia, but in fact these debates show that "the framers were virtually of 
one mind when it came to giving treaties the status of law."18 What is 
most striking about these debates is that, after the convention voted to 
adopt the provision declaring treaties to be law, no one-least of all the 
defenders of the House's prerogatives-proposed to deny treaties the 
force oflaw unless implemented by statute.19 The Framers who objected 
to giving treaties the status of law without giving the House a role in their 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 457, 460 (Merrill Jensen ed., 
1976) [hereinafter Documentary History]. But I cannot see how the fact that some 
Founders thought that the British did regard treaties as having the effect of domestic law 
even without legislative implementation supports Professor Yoo's argument that our 
Constitution denies treaties such effect. 
15. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698. 
16. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2086. 
17. Id. at 2089. 
18. Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2120 (quoting Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional 
Puzzle: The Treaty Making Clause as a Case Study, 1 Persp. Am. Hist. 233, 264 (1984)). 
19. This is all the more striking because the Supremacy Clause was adopted as a 
substitute for a proposal to give the legislature the principal role in ensuring state 
compliance with treaties. See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1105-06 
(discussing proposal to give legislature the power to negative state laws that conflicted with 
treaties). 
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making proposed to address this seeming anomaly by including the 
House in the treatymaking process, not by denying treaties the force of 
law. Indeed, the proponents of a House role in treatymaking defended 
their position on the ground that it would enhance treaty compliance. 
When Madison objected to Gouverneur Morris's proposal to give the 
House a role in the making of treaties, arguing that it would make it too 
difficult to enter into treaties, Morris replied that he was not disposed to 
make treatymaking too easy: The greater the difficulty in making them, 
the more seriously they will be taken.20 That treaties should be taken 
20. See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 393 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter Farrand, Records]. In light of Morris's explanation of his proposal, 
Professor Yoo's reading of the comments by WJ.lson and Johnson that immediately follow 
are implausible. Wilson, speaking in favor of Morris's proposal, noted that the British 
Crown "is under the same fetters as the amendment of Mr. Morris will impose on the 
Senate," as the king is "obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of [treaties]." Id. 
Johnson, speaking against the amendment, noted that "The Example of the King of G. B. 
was not parallel. Full & compleat power was vested in him-If the Parliament should fail 
to provide the necessary means of execution, the Treaty would he violated." Id. Yoo's 
reading of these statements as showing that WJ.lson and Johnson "thought that Congress's 
legislative powers gave it sole control over a treaty's domestic implementation" is 
mysterious. Yoo, Globalism, supra note I, at 2033. WJ.lson merely cites the British rule 
requiring Parliamentary implementation as a reason not to be concerned about giving the 
House a role in the making of treaties. (Morris had just gotten through clarifying that 
under his proposal treaties could not be made without the House's involvement.) If 
anything, the fact that WJ.lson was speaking in support of Morris's amendment indicates 
that he did not regard this regime as inherent. Johnson was criticizing Morris's proposal, 
but he appears to have been making primarily a semantic point. He said "there was 
something of solecism in saying that the acts of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers 
from one Body, should depend for ratification on another Body." 2 Farrand, Records, 
supra, at 393. In other words, it is inconsistent to say that someone has "full and compleat 
power" to make a treaty but at the same time that the treaty is subject to ratification by 
another body. He cited the British rule to show that the treaties in Great Britain were 
binding once made, but required action by Parliament to ensure compliance. To the 
extent he was making a substantive point, he presumably was pressing for a regime in 
which the negotiators had full authority to make the treaty without the need for 
ratification by another body. His statement that if the Parliament failed to act the treaty 
would be violated reads more like a criticism than an endorsement of such a regime. 
That WJ.lson did not view a House role in the implementation of treaties to be 
inherent is shown clearly by his subsequent renewal of Morris's amendment. He said: "As 
treaties ... are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also." 
Id. at 538. In discussing this episode, Yoo switches gears. He reads the defeat ofWJ.lson's 
proposal as not necessarily endorsing his premise that treaties "are to have the operation of 
laws," but merely as a determination that the House's "structural inadequacies" made it 
unsuitable for a role in the making of treaties. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2039. A 
number of points should be made. First, whatever the reason for the defeat of the 
proposal, the fact that Wilson made it shows that Yoo's earlier interpretation of his remark 
is untenable. Second, Wilson's premise that treaties are "to have the operation of laws" 
shows that WJ.lson was not as incompetent at reading legal texts as Yoo's discussion of his 
comments at the ratifying convention would lead one to believe. See id. at 2036. It 
provides strong additional support for Professor Flaherty's interpretation of those 
comments. Finally, Yoo fails to appreciate that the "structural inadequacies" that render 
the House unsuitable for a role in the making of treaties make it just as unsuitable for a 
role in their implementation. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
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seriously once made was common ground. There is not a shred of evi-
dence that anyone wanted to give the House the power to block compli-
ance with treaties already in force. The cavalier attitude towards treaty 
compliance that Professor Yoo implicidy attributes to the Founders21 is 
nowhere to be found in the records of the debates in Philadelphia. 
Professor Yoo also misses the implication for his theory of the Fram-
ers' conclusion that the House was "structurally unsuited" for the 
treatymaking process:22 The feature of the House that unsuited it for 
treatymaking equally unsuited it for a veto over treaty compliance. The 
argument that the House must be excluded from the treatymaking pro-
cess because of the need for secrecy would have had no purchase whatsoever 
for someone who assumed that the House would eventually be involved 
anyway because the Constitution required House action to implement 
treaties. If complying with the treaty would have required House action, 
then the prudent course for the treatymakers to follow would have been 
to get the House's approval before concluding the treaty. If so, then a 
requirement of House action to implement treaties would have been re-
garded as the substantial equivalent of a requirement of House action at 
the stage of making the treaty. 23 If the treatymakers failed to get the 
House's approval before making the treaty, they would have had to get it 
later. If the House was deemed structurally unsuited for a veto at the 
earlier stage, then there would appear to be no reason for regarding it as 
better suited at the later stage. The only difference is that a requirement 
of House involvement at the later stage would be more dangerous, as it 
would make it more likely that a treaty in force would be violated. 
In the end, even Professor Yoo appears to concede that the debates 
at Philadelphia support the prevailing interpretation of the Supremacy 
Clause. He argues, however, that these debates do not deserve much 
weight because, after all, the Convention merely resulted in a proposal. It 
was the ratifying conventions that gave life to the Constitution, and thus it 
is the interpretations of the Constitution reflected in those debates that 
are important. 24 He criticizes the defenders of the prevailing view for 
relying primarily on the debates at Philadelphia and failing to give ade-
quate consideration to what he regards as the counter-narrative that 
emerges from certain ratifying conventions. 25 In his view, these debates 
show that the Federalists significantly watered down their position to 
meet Anti-Federalist objections regarding the Constitution's freezing of 
the House out of the treatymaking process. 26 
21. The attitude is made more explicit in the Rejoinder. See Yoo, Treaties and Public 
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2227 & n.34. 
22. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2036. 
23. This appears to have been the gist of the comment by Wilson at the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention relied on by Yoo. See infra notes 46--49 and accompanying text. 
24. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2039-40. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. at 2025. 
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As Professor Flaherty shows, a fair reading of these debates tells a 
very different story, one that is fully consistent with-indeed, buttresses-
the interpretation Professor Yoo disputes.27 Rather than address Profes-
sor Yoo's readings of specific aspects of the debate, I ·will comment on the 
interpretive theory that appears to underlie his belief that the natural 
reading of a constitutional text should yield to an agreement between 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists at one or more ratifying conventions re-
garding the meaning of the text. I call it the "contractual theory" of origi-
nal intent. 
More moderate originalists often say that originalism does not seek 
to uncover how the Founders would have resolved specific questions, but 
instead seeks to ascertain how an ordinary reader at the time of the 
Founding would have understood the words of the Constitution.28 If this 
is the point of the originalist enterprise, a broad array of sources would 
supply relevant evidence. It would be appropriate to consult the debates 
at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia; the debates at the state 
ratifying conventions, even ones that voted not to ratify;29 the roughly 
contemporaneous writings of participants in the framing and/ or ratifying 
conventions, such asJustice Iredell's opinion in Ware3° and ChiefJustice 
Jay's charge to thejuryin Henfteld's Case;31 and even the roughly contem-
poraneous ·writings of nonparticipants in those conventions, such as Jus-
tice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.32 
Some originalists have insisted that it is the understanding of the 
Constitution at the ratifying conventions that should be binding, as it is 
only as a result of the votes at those conventions that the Constitution by 
its terms came into force.33 Yet dra·wing conclusions about an original 
understanding based on the debates at the ratifying conventions is im-
peded by a number of factors. First, our evidence is far from complete, as 
we have records of only some of these conventions, and the records that 
do exist are abysmal.34 Moreover, 
[ w] e possess neither the equations needed to convert expres-
sions of individual opinion on particular provisions into collec-
tive understandings nor formulas to extract from the unstable 
compounds of hopes and fears and expectations those elements 
27. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2126-51. 
28. See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 143-44 (1990). 
29. But see Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1984 n.129 (criticizing defenders of the 
prevailing view for relying on the North Carolina convention because this convention 
resulted in a vote not to ratify). 
30. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256-80 (1796) (Iredell,J., concurring); 
Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 697 & n.12; Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra 
note 8, at 1110-13. 
31. See Benfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099,1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360); Vazquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1103 n.82. 
32. See Story, supra note 14; Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698-99. 
33. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 16, 341 (1996). 
34. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2103 (citing James H. Hutson, The Creation of the 
Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986) ). 
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that best predicted how the Constitution would operate in prac-
tice. Nor can one tidily graph how these perceptions shifted 
over time, as participants on both sides grappled with objections 
and counterarguments or thought through the implications of 
their own positions.35 
Additionally, the heated political context casts doubt on the reliability of 
statements made during this process as reports of the speakers' under-
standing of the document. Particularly suspect are statements made 
orally in the heat of a highly adversarial debate (as distinguished from 
documents like the Federalist Papers, written in relative tranquility).36 
For these reasons, the best evidence of the ratifiers' understanding of the 
document may in the end be the same as the best evidence of the ordi-
nary readers' understanding.37 
Although he never develops it in the article, Professor Yoo appears to 
be operating under an interpretive theory that employs more specific cri-
teria for assessing the positions taken during the ratification debates. 1 
call it the "contractual theory," as it appears to regard as binding certain 
agreements reached between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists at 
some ratifying conventions. The point ofProfessorYoo's historical narra-
tive appears to be that the Federalists ·watered down their interpretation 
of the Supremacy Clause in consideration of the agreement of certain 
Anti-Federalists to drop their objections and vote in favor of ratification. 
Because this ·watering down was how the Constitution's peddlers suc-
ceeded in selling it to wavering buyers, Professor Yoo appears to be argu-
ing, their agreements on those interpretations should be binding.38 
35. Rakove, supra note 33, at 134. 
36. See id. at 16-17, 132-34. The emphasis in the parenthetical is on "relative." See, 
e.g., !.any D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 667 (1999); EdmundS. 
Morgan, The Federalist, The New Republic, Feb. 26, 1996, at 37. 
37. Privileging the ratification may have one valid implication for originalism. If what 
is relevant is how the ratifiers understood the document, then any evidence that the 
Framers in Philadelphia interpreted a particular provision in a counterintuitive way should 
be irrelevant, except to the extent this information was conveyed to the ratifiers. But this 
works against Professor Yoo, as it is he who relies on nonpublic evidence to defend a 
counterintuitive reading. For example, he relies on statements by Wilson andJohnson at 
the Philadelphia Convention that he reads as support for the idea that non-self-execution 
was regarded as inherent in the concept of legislation. See supra note 20. He also relies 
on an unpublished memorandum written by Madison. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, 
at 2021 (citing James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 
1787), in 9 Papers of James Madison 345-57 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal 
eds., 1975)). 
38. Thus, in explaining why Wilson's statements at the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention deserve special weight, Professor Yoo writes that "[i]t was the public 
explanation of the Constitution's meaning, before the first critical state ratification 
convention, that 'sold' the Constitution to its ratifiers." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 
2048. Professor Flaherty likewise reads Professor Yoo to be operating under what I call the 
contractual theory. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2134 (noting that Yoo argues that "the 
Federalists contorted the Supremacy Clause ... as a price for ratification"). 
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This theory holds some promise for someone trying to defend as 
counterintuitive a reading of the Constitution's text as Professor Yoo's. 
Even an agreement among the parties to a contract that a particular pro-
vision shall be regarded as meaningless or shall mean the opposite of 
what its words denote would be binding. on the parties under the com-
mon law.39 This theory would also obviate the question whether the Fed-
eralists involved truly understood the words of the document to mean 
what they claimed in the debates, or instead embraced the interpretation 
for political reasons. Indeed, this theory would make a virtue out of what 
appeared to be a liability, as its whole point is that certain political deci-
sions should be binding.40 
Despite its potential benefits for someone in the precarious textual 
position in which Professor Yoo finds himself, the theory is ultimately un-
availing. First, under black-letter contract law, anyone trying to introduce 
evidence that a contractual provision was intended to be meaningless, or 
to mean the opposite of what it says, is required to present un~ually 
probative evidence of a meeting of the minds.41 Yet, as Professor Yoo 
hinlself ultimately admits, the evidence in support ofYoo's position is no 
more than inconclusive.42 Second, to show that an agreement is binding 
under the contractual theory requires a showing of causation-i.e., a 
showing that the Federalists' watering down of their interpretation actu-
ally induced a decisive number of Anti-Federalists to vote to ratify. This 
sort of evidence is difficult to come by in any context, but certain features 
of the ratification debates make it especially unlikely that the Federalist 
39. See infra note 41. 
40. An apparent use of something like this theory can be found in Supreme Court 
decisions regarding state sovereign immunity. During the ratification debates, some Anti-
Federalists argned that Article ill permitted individuals to sue states in the federal courts 
on their revolutionary war debts. In response, some Federalists argued that nothing in the 
Constitution did away with state sovereign immunity, and that Article ill thus conferred 
federal jurisdiction in cases between states and individuals only where the state was the 
plaintiff. John Marshall made this point at the Virginia ratifying convention. Of course, 
the Supreme Court in Chislwlm v. Georgia decided the issue as the Anti-Federalists had 
feared, but in response the Eleventh Amendment was adopted. In interpreting this 
Amendment as Chief Justice, Marshall appeared to take a narrower view of state immunity 
than he had taken at the ratifying convention, and for this he has been accused of 
employing a sort of bait-and-switch tactic. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. 
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 482 n.ll (1987), in which Justice Powell accuses Marshall of this. 
(The characterization is mine. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur di!lene, 
Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh 
Amendment Doctrine, 87 Geo. LJ. 1, 88 n.504 (1998).) This accusation suggests a version 
of the contractual theory described above. (There are, however, reasons that might justify 
this theory's use in the context of state sovereign immuuity that would not apply to the self-
execution issue, the main one being that the view of state sovereign immunity espoused by 
the Federalists in selling the Constitution to the Anti-Federalists was arguably later ratified 
in a constitutional amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XI.) 
41. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. e (1981); Arthur L. Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts§ 542 (1952). 
42. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2094. 
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statements Professor Yoo points to, even if read as Professor Yoo reads 
them, actually switched any votes. As Professor Rakove has emphasized, 
the decision facing the ratifiers was "momentous- and binary: whether to 
retain the Articles of Confederation or instead adopt a radically different 
governmental system.43 In making that choice, the delegates had to 
weigh a multitude of disparate factors. It is highly unlikely that an affirm-
ative vote could be attributed in any meaningful .way to any particular 
feature. It is particularly unlikely that many Anti-Federalists were swayed 
by Federalist assurances that treaties that had already received the ap-
proval of two-thirds of the Senate and bound the United States interna-
tionally would lack the force of internal law ·without the consent of a ma-
jority of the House.44 
Moreover, the Anti-Federalists could have "relied" on these assur-
ances only if they regarded their own interpretations of the Constitution, 
however idiosyncratic, as binding on future authoritative interpreters. 
Yet substantial doubts have been raised about whether the Founders em-
braced a theory of interpretation under which their own views would be 
binding on future interpreters.45 If the delegates regarded their own 
statements as merely predictions about how future interpreters would 
read the words of the Constitution ·without reference to their intent, then 
it is difficult to see how this debate could have generated a binding 
"agreement" on any interpretation. Furthermore, some of the statements 
that Professor Yoo relies on most strongly were offered as nothing more 
43. See Rakove, supra note 33, at 96;Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To 
It), 65 Fordham L Rev. 1587, 1604 (1997). 
44. To the extent the Anti-Federalists had a common concern, it was that the 
Constitution gave too much power to the federal government at the expense of the states. 
See J.R. Pole, The American Constitution: For and Against 17 (1987). But treatymaking 
already required the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, "which was taken to be the 
collective embodiment of the concerns of the states." G. Edward White, Observations on 
the Turning of Foreign Affairs jurisprudence, 70 U. Colo. L Rev. 1109, 1119 (1999); see 
also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 
412 (1998); Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2231 (stating that 
Framers feared the Senate would be "state-dominated"). Although Anti-Federalists may 
well have preferred a narrower treatymaking power, it is far less clear that they would have 
been happy with a regime that made it more likely that treaties already made would be 
violated. See infra note 50. 
45. Compare H. jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 885, 948 (1985) (arguing that the Framers did not understand their intent to 
be an appropriate basis for constitutional analysis), and Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" 
in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1001, 1104 (1991) 
(agreeing with Powell), with Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to Jefferson 
Powell, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1033, 1093 (1989) (disputing Powell's conclusion regarding 
Framers' disapproval of original intent in constitutional interpretation), Richard S. Kay, 
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections 
and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 274 (1988) (finding Powell's argwnents against 
original intent unpersuasive), and Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent?, 5 Const. Commentary 77, 77 (1988) (disputing Powell's conclusion 
regarding the Framers' disapproval of original intent in constitutional interpretation). 
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than predictions of how things might develop. For example, ProfessorYoo 
relies on the following statement by Wilson at the Pennsylvania 
Convention: , 
[T]hough the House of Representatives possess no active part in 
making treaties, yet their legislative authority will be found to 
have strong restraining influence upon both President and Sen-
ate. In England, if the king_and his ministers find themselves, 
during their negotiation, to be embarrassed, because an existing 
law is not repealed, or a new law is not enacted, they give notice 
to the legislature of their situation and inform them that it will 
be necessary, before the treaty can operate, that some law be 
repealed or some be made. And will not the same thing take place 
here?46 
Even if we assumed that Wilson meant to convey the idea that treaties 
would lack domestic legal force without legislative implementation, he 
formulates this idea, as Professor Yoo himself notes,47 as a prediction.48 
A prediction is an invitation to agree (or not) on a factual issue-i.e., the 
course of future events over which the speaker has no direct control; it is 
not an invitation to agree on a binding interpretation. 49 
Finally, even if the evidence did establish that the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists "agreed" on a given interpretation at one or two ratifying 
conventions, it is unclear why that agreement should be binding on the 
nation as a whole. Even if it could be shown definitively that Vrrginia or 
New York or Pennsylvania, or all three, would have rejected the Constitu-
46. James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), 
in 2 Documentary History, supra note 14, at 562-63 (emphasis added, following Yoo, 
Globalism, supra note 1, at 2047). Professor Yoo omits the remainder of the passage: 
"ShaU less prudence, less caution, less moderation take place among those who negotiate treaties for the 
United States, than among those who negotiate them for the other nations of the earth?" I d. at 563 
(emphasis added). 
47. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2047. 
48. Technically, it is not even a prediction; it is a question. I shall overlook the 
technicality, however, as the question appears to invite the audience to agree that certain 
things will happen. Nonetheless, as Professor Flaherty suggests, Wilson here displays an 
almost Clintonian talent for studied ambiguity. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2130-31. 
The passage is thus exceedingly weak evidence of the sort of agreement Professor Yoo 
seeks to prove. 
49. Wilson's prediction, moreover, was about what the negotiators of the treaty would 
do in the future. See supra note 46. It therefore does not support the claim that all 
treaties would require legislative implementation. At best (and even this is a stretch), it 
would support the claim that the treatymakers have the power to render a treaty non-self-
executing (something I do not dispute). More likely, Wilson was just observing that, in 
those limited situations in which the Constitution specifically requires House involvement 
(such as appropriations), the treatymakers would be well advised to get the House's 
approval beforehand. This supports the idea that a requirement of House involvement in 
implementation is the practical equivalent (for prudent treatymakers) of a requirement of 
House involvement in the making of the treaty. The statement thus supports my claim that 
the Founders would have regarded the reasons for denying the House a role in the making 
of treaties as reasons for denying it a role in treaty implementation as well. See supra text 
following note 22. 
HeinOnline  -- 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2167 1999
1999] LAUGHING AT TREATIES 2167 
tion unless the reference to treaties were read out of the Supremacy 
Clause, it would remain a possibility that Massachusetts and New Jersey 
and Georgia would have ratified only if the reference to treaties remained 
in the clause. 5° Indeed, it is precisely because no state had the power to 
control the other states as a group that the choice facing each of them 
was an up-or-down vote on .the Constitution as a whole. This fact alone 
makes it unlikely that the delegates .regarded their role as the reaching of 
binding agreements on matters of interpretation. It shows, at any rate, 
50. The only argument I can think of to explain why an agreement of this sort at a few 
conventions should bind the rest of the nation wonld apply at best only to agreements to 
construe federal power narrowly. The argument would begin with two assumptions: (a) 
the Anti-Federalists at every state convention objected primarily to the breadth of power 
the Constitution gave the federal government at the expense of the states, and (b) the 
Federalists at every state convention wonld have preferred the new Constitution, even if 
narrowly construed, over the Articles of Confederation. Based on these assumptions 
(which I shall grant for purposes of argument), a plausible argument can be made that the 
narrowest construction to which the Federalists were forced to retreat at any of the state 
conventions shonld be binding because, without the retreat, the Constitution wonld not 
have been ratified. (I shall disregard for the moment the problems stemming from the 
fact that more states ratified the Constitution than the nine necessary to bring it into force 
pursuant to its terms. I will credit Professor Yoo's argument that the enterprise wonld not 
have succeeded without Vrrginia, Pennsylvania, or New York. See Yoo, Globalism, supra 
note 1, at 2059; cf. Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863-1869, 
at 104-06 (1990) (arguing that the conservative Republicans' narrow construction of the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment shonld be 
binding because their support was necessary for the Amendment's passage in Congress).) 
Perhaps an agreement reached at a single convention about the scope of the 
treatymaking power could be said to be binding on the rest of the nation on this theory. 
See infra Part ill.B.2 (suggesting that one reading of the material Professor Yoo relies on is 
that treaties may not be made on matters falling within Art. I, § 8, but r~ecting this 
position on doctrinal as well as textual grounds). But if the issue is whether treaties already 
validly made by the President and Senate wonld require implementation by statute, the 
argument does not fly. One cannot assume that Anti-Federalists would have preferred a 
regime in which treaties that bound us internationally would lack the force of internal law 
without House action over a regime in which treaties automatically had domestic legal 
force once made. Once a treaty is made, every state has an interest in compliance with it, 
as noncompliance wonld be likely to produce retaliation against the nation as a whole. For 
some states, the interest in compliance might be outweighed by their opposition to the 
particnlar terms of the treaty, and, if so, such states might welcome Professor Yoo's rule 
with respect to that particular treaty. But for other treaties, the same state might prefer 
compliance. Of course, a state that prefers compliance would be free to comply even 
under Professor Yoo's rule, but the problem is that Professor Yoo's rule makes it more 
likely that other states would fail to comply, thus potentially vitiating the benefits of the 
treaty for all the states. A state adopting a cost/benefit approach in choosing a 
constitutional rule to govern all future treaties, and trying to decide between Professor 
Yoo's regime and a regime giving treaties automatic effect as law, would have to make 
difficult predictions about such things as how many future treaties will be to its liking and 
the likelihood that the House would fail to implement such treaties. Because it is far from 
clear that a delegate concerned with preserving states' rights would prefer Professor Yoo's 
rule, it cannot be assumed that, without an agreement at a single convention that treaties 
would not have the force of law once made, the Constitution would not have entered into 
force. 
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why we should not regard any decision made at the ratifying conventions 
as binding except the decisi?n to ratify the Constitution's text.51 
For the foregoing reasons, the contractual theory seems both flawed 
and unavailing to Professor Yoo.52 It is only from the perspective of 
someone who embraces this theory, however, that the less selective use of 
the founding material by the defenders of the prevailing view appears to 
be a "confused jumble. "53 If one rejects the contractual theory, the point 
oflooking at material from the founding would appear to be simply to try 
to understand how the ratifiers understood the words of the Constitution. 
For the reasons given above, this project is substantially the same as at-
tempting to understand how an ordinary, well-informed reader would 
have understood those words. 54 
51. Professor Yoo erroneously attributes to me the position that "the ratification 
debates are relevant only insofar as they show that the states adopted the Constitution." 
Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2222 n.17. In my view, the 
ratification debates are as relevant to interpreting the Constitution as other founding-era 
materials. All of it is relevant insofar as it sheds light on how the Founders understood the 
text of the document they were adopting. My point is that the only decision reached at such 
conventions that should be regarded as binding is the decision to adopt the Constitution's 
text. I also call into question Professor Yoo's enterprise of relying on these debates to 
contradict rather than illuminate the constitutional text. I emphatically do not object to 
"using the original understanding at all in constitutional interpretation." Id. Indeed, I 
stand by my own prior use of founding-era material. See supra notes 30-32 and 
accompanying text and infra note 54. 
52. In light of Professor Yoo's apparent embrace of this thesis, it is interesting to 
consider his interpretation of statements by Wilson and Johnson, suggesting that they 
believed the need to implement treaties by statute to be "inherent" in the concept of 
legislation. See supra note 20 (discussingYoo's interpretation of Wilson and Johnson). It 
is odd to argue that people engaged in the process of writing a constitution wonld regard 
any separation-of-powers issue as "inherently" beyond their control. Cf. Naftali Bendavid, 
When Congress Tries to Sideline Court, Legal Times, Mar. 6, 1995, at 2, 18 (quoting 
Professor Charles Fried as saying that "[t]he idea of an unconstitutional amendment to the 
Constitution is stupid"). It is even odder to defend the position these speakers regarded as 
"inherent" by reference to their statements. By hypothesis, these persons believed that the 
need for legislation would persist no matter what they included in the Constitution. As 
Yoo interprets these statements, therefore, they support the position that the Framers tried 
to accomplish something (i.e., giving treaties direct effect as law) that in the view of these 
speakers a constitution could not accomplish. The only pertinent issue for us is what they 
tried to accomplish. If Wilson and Johnson did believe that this could not be 
accomplished through a constitution, history has proven them wrong. See infra Part III.B. 
53. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1982. 
54. Because my intent in consulting this material was to shed light on how the 
founding generation understood certain terms, I have cited the Founders' discussion of 
those terms even when the discussion did not relate to the particular clause in question. 
See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1098 (discussing the Founders' 
understanding of the concepts of "law" and "treaties" in the Federalist 15); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 62-66 ("intratextual" analysis of the phrase "shall be"). It is only 
because Professor Yoo is operating under a more rigid contractual model of interpretation 
that he can dismiss my reliance on these sources as irrelevant because they do not relate to 
the treaty power. See e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1984. 
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II. Yeo's TExTUAL PROBLEM 
Should someone ask me why I think the Constitution gives treaties 
the force of domestic law, I would be tempted to respond by paraphras-
ing George Leigh Mallory's explanation for attempting to scale Mount 
Everest: "Because it's there" in the Constitution.55 The Supremacy 
Clause provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the 'supreme Law of the 
Land."56 No interpretation is necessary to conclude that this clause pur-
ports to give "all" treaties the status of domestic law. 
But Professor Yoo is nothing if not bold in the face of constitutional 
texts.57 He concludes that our Constitution does not give treaties the 
effect of domestic law once "made" by the President with the consent of 
the Senate pursuant to Article II. Instead, he maintains, our Constitution 
can properly be read to establish that validly made treaties do not "take 
effect as internal U.S. law" until implemented by federal statute.58 Yoo 
does not square his position with the Supremacy Clause's text by arguing 
that the clause's reference to the "Law of the Land" is a reference to 
something other than "internal U.S. law."59 Rather, he maintains that 
Professor Henkin (and many others) erroneously assume that the 
Supremacy Clause was meant to give treaties automatic effect as law. 60 He 
sees nothing in the Constitution that conflicts with the idea that treaties 
have domestic legal force only if and when the House joins the President 
and the Senate in passing an implementing statute. 61 In other words, he 
thinks the Supremacy Clause can be read as non-self-executing. 
This argument, however, overlooks the wording of the clause. The 
clause provides that "all" treaties which "shall be made" under the author-
55. See John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 593 n.2 (16th ed. 1992) ("Because it is 
there."). George Steinbrenner also offers some relevant wisdom: "We can't start to talk 
about philosophy and intent and spirit of the rule if it's [written] there in black and white." 
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 399 (1985) (quoting George 
Steinbrenner) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
57. This was already apparent in his work on war powers, where he has attempted to 
show that the clause giving the Congress the power to declare war does not inhibit the 
President from employing troops in war without a prior declaration. Yoo reads the clause 
instead as merely giving the Congress the power to recognize (or not) that a state of war 
exists and to bring about the legal effects that follow from a declaration to that effect. See 
generally, John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1169, 1178-79 (1999);John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other 
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 295 (1996). 
58. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1962. 
59. For example, Professor Yoo criticizes Professor Louis Henkin's statement that our 
Constitution "mean[s) that treaties are law of the land of their own accord and do not 
require an act of Congress to translate them into law." ld. at 1977 (quoting Henkin, supra 
note 8, at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Yoo, Treaties and Public 
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 n.119 (equating "law of the land" with "domestic law"). 
60. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1977. 
61. See id. 
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ity of the United States "shall be" the law of the land. The natural read-
ing of that language is that they "shall be" the law of the land once 
"made." The only even remotely plausible textual basis for Professor 
Yoo's construction would take the clause's use of the future tense to sig-
nify that treaties "shall be" the supreme law of the land not once made 
but at some later time. So read, the clause would function as an instruc-
tion to the lawmakers to pass the relevant statutes. 62 But the clause can-
not be read that way. The clause does indeed employ the future tense, 
but the future event that triggers the treaty's status as law of the land is 
plainly the coming into force of the treaty. The words "shall be" in the 
Supremacy Clause apply equally to the Constitution and federal statutes, 
yet the clause has always been read to make the Constitution and federal 
statutes the supreme law of the land immediately upon their coming into 
force.63 
That the term "shall be" in the Supremacy Clause does not denote 
non-self-execution is confirmed by its use in other Articles. Article I says 
that the legislative power "shall be" vested in Congress, 64 and Article II 
provides that the executive power "shall be" vested in the President. 65 In 
both contexts, the vesting has been understood to be effective by virtue of 
the adoption of the Constitution itself, without the need for additional 
legislative action. Article m provides that the judicial power "shall be" 
vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may 
establish. 66 Here, too, the language has been read as self-executing. The 
Supreme Court is understood to possess the whole judicial power, as de-
scribed in Article ill, Section 2, by virtue of the Constitution itself. 67 With 
respect to the lower federal courts, the vesting is understood to be non-
self-executing, but that is not because of the use of the term "shall be," 
but rather because of the language making it clear that Congress has the 
discretion whether or not to establish lower federal courts. 68 
Interpreting the Supremacy Clause to give treaties the force of do-
mestic law only to the extent they are implemented by statute would also 
62. As discussed below, even this reading of the clause would conflict with Professor 
Yoo's thesis, as he clearly contemplates that the Congress would have discretion whether or 
not to pass such legislation. See infra note 126 and accompanying text 
63. This is by no means an inherent feature of constitutions or statutes. One can 
envision a regime in which a statute is passed but does not have certain effects we normally 
associate with supreme law until some other legal act is performed. Indeed, the Framers 
considered and rejected a system in which the Constitution and federal statutes would not 
necessarily have had the effect of nullifying inconsistent state laws. See generally Vazquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1106 & nn.91& 94 (discussing proposal for a federal 
power to "negative" state laws). 
64. U.S. Const art I,§ 1. 
65. Id. art II, § 1. 
66. Id. art III, § 1. 
67. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1868). 
68. See U.S. Const art I, § 8, cl. 9. For a discussion of the pedigree of intratextual 
arguments of the sort I make in this paragraph, see Akhil Reed Amar, lntratextualism, 112 
Harv. L. Rev. 747, 788-95 (1999). 
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have the unfortunate effect of reading the reference to treaties entirely 
out of the Supremacy Clause. A treaty that has the force of domestic law 
only to the extent a federal statute gives it such force would not have the 
effect of domestic law before or after the statute's enactment; when and if 
it is implemented, only the implementing statute would have domestic 
legal force.69 Had the Founders intended to establish such a regime, they 
could (and should) have omitted the reference to treaties from the 
Supremacy Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause70 would still have 
given Congress the power to pass statutes implementing treaties, and the 
Supremacy Clause's reference to federal statutes would have sufficed to 
give supremacy to any such statutes. Professor Yoo notes that his reading 
would treat the Supremacy Clause's reference to treaties "much in the 
way that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the federal govern-
ment with the authority to pass enabling legislation for other constitu-
tional grants of power."71 He fails to see that this undermines his argu-
ment. The Constitution already has a "necessary and proper" clause that 
gives Congress the power to implement treaties. 72 A longstanding and 
unimpeachable axiom of legal interpretation advises us to strive to avoid 
interpretations that render provisions redundant. 73 
Perhaps in tacit recognition of the textual difficulty with this broad 
position, Professor Yoo advances in the alternative a narrower claim: 
Treaties lack the force of domestic laws not categorically, but presump-
tively.74 Although he is not clear about exactly what is needed to over-
69. The Restatement makes clear that "it is the implementing legislation, rather than 
the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the United States," for non-self-executing 
treaties. Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111 cmt. h (1987). 
70. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
71. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979. 
72. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 ("[Congress shall have the power to] make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."). This is the clause that has been 
understood to give the Congress the power to pass statutes implementing non-self. 
executing treaties. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("If the treaty is valid 
there can be no dispute about the validity of the [implementing] statute under Article 1, 
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government."). 
73. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997) ("The Court will avoid an 
interpretation of a statute that 'renders some words altogether redundant.'" (quoting 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995))); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 
528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute.'" (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882))); Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed that any clause of the 
constitution is intended to be without effect."); see also Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy 
Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons & Marathon, 1982 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 25, 30; Maurice]. Holland, The Modest Usefulness ofDOMA Section 2, 32 Creighton 
L. Rev. 395, 397 (1998) ("To [attribute identical meaning to two Clauses of the 
Constitution] is to violate a fundamental maxim of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation to the effect that redundancy is to be avoided."). 
74. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2092. 
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come the presumption, it does appear that, on this view, the treatymakers 
have the power to give the treaties they make the force of domestic law.75 
The reference to treaties in the Supremacy Clause would thus have some 
role to play under this interpretation: It would serve as the basis for the 
treatymakers' power to determine whether or not the treaties they make 
shall have the force of domestic law. Without the clause, their role might 
have been thought to extend only to the making of the international 
agreement. 
But this reading of the Supremacy Clause-which I have called the 
"power-conferring" interpretation 76-is almost as difficult to square with 
the clause's text as a flat rule of non-self-execution. The Supremacy 
Clause is not written as a power-conferring provision; it is written as a 
status-conferring provision. Article I gives the President the power to 
make treaties, with the consent of a supermcgority of the Senate; and the 
Supremacy Clause purports to give the treaties they make the status of 
domestic law. The claim that the clause is not self-executing runs into the 
textual problems noted above, whether the power to execute is alleged to 
reside in the lawmakers or the treatymakers. The Supremacy Clause itself 
purports to give treaties the force of domestic law. 77 
In short, if the question is whether treaties of the United States, val-
idly concluded by the constitutionally appointed treatymakers and in 
force, are the "Law of the Land" once made, it is answered by the Consti-
tution's text. The claim that such treaties only acquire the force of "inter-
nal U.S. law"78 once implemented by an internal U.S. law is simply not an 
eligible interpretation of that text. The claim that the Constitution estab-
lishes a presumption that treaties lack domestic legal force is more plausi-
ble, but not nearly plausible enough. 
To be sure, the text does not answer all questions concerning the 
domestic enforcement of treaties. There remain substantial questions 
about what it means to say that the Constitution, federal statutes, and trea-
ties have the force of law. Specifically, there remain important questions 
about the relationship between the idea that all treaties are the law of the 
land and the doctrine that some treaties are non-self-executing. If Profes-
sor Yoo's argument that treaties either categorically or presumptively lack 
domestic legal force cannot withstand a textual analysis, perhaps his 
larger project can be salvaged by casting it as a claim that our Constitu-
75. See id. 
76. See Vazquez, Self-Executing Character, supra note 8, at 46-47 (concluding that 
this argument must be rejected, if only on textual grounds). 
77. For doctrinal reasons, I ultimately accept that the treatymakers have the power to 
determine in certain circumstances that a treaty shall not have the force of domestic law. 
See infra Part III.A2. But the tension between this power and the Supremacy Clause's 
text, in my view, requires that the Supremacy Clause remain the default rule and that the 
treatymakers' power to countermand it be strictly limited. 
78. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1962. 
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tion establishes either a flat rule or a presumption that treaties are not 
self-executing. 
The textual problem is not so easily escaped, however. I have argued 
elsewhere that our Constitution should be read to establish a presump-
tion that treaties are self-executing, relying in part on the claim that the 
concept of a non-self-executing treaty is in tension with the Supremacy 
Clause's designation of treaties as "law."79 One might have expected a 
defense of the concept of non-self-execution to attempt to show that I 
have misinterpreted the term "law" in that clause-that there is no ten-
sion between a treaty's non-self-executing character and its status as 
"law."80 But Professor Yoo does not do that.81 Indeed, he apparently 
agrees with the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, which maintains 
that a non-self-executing treaty lacks the force of domestic law.82 As dis-
cussed further below, Professor Yoo is unquestionably right in conceding 
that a non-self-executing treaty, as he understands the concept, lacks the 
force of domestic law. This, however, is exactly why the concept of a non-
self-executing treaty is rightly regarded as constitutionally problematic. 
III. JUDICIAL DoCTRINE 
Professor Yoo's position that, notwithstanding the Supremacy 
Clause, not all treaties of the United States have the force of domestic law 
finds stronger support in judicial precedent than in text or the founding 
material. The support consists of the cases recognizing that certain trea-
ties, though in force internationally, are not "self-executing." These cases 
offer some support for his position because there is some tension be-
tvveen the concept of a non-self-executing treaty and the Supremacy 
Clause's declaration that treaties are "law." 
In other work, I discuss the nature of the apparent conflict between 
the concept of a non-self-executing treaty and the status of those treaties 
as law, and consider whether the two can be reconciled.83 The often-
expressed sense that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic 
law appears to be based on the fact that such treaties, unlike most law, 
79. See, e.g., Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 700-10. 
80. Cf. Khaldoun A. Baghdadi, Note, Apples and Oranges-The Supremacy Clause 
and the Determination of Self-Executing Treaties: A Response to Professor Vazquez, 20 
Hastings lnt'l & Comp. L. Rev. 701, 701 (1997) (arguing that Supremacy Clause has no 
bearing on whether a treaty is self-executing). 
81. Professor Yoo does suggest in passing that the fact that a norm is not judicially 
enforceable does not mean that it is not law in some sense. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 
1, at 1967. That he consistently equates a non-self-executing treaty with one that does not 
have domestic legal force indicates that he has not quite convinced himself of that 
proposition. See id. at 1965-66, 1974, 2036. Moreover, as discussed below, he never 
elaborates an understanding of the concept of law under which unexecuted, non-sel£. 
executing treaties would be law. 
82. See id. at 1972 (citing Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111(4)(a) & cmt. h 
(1987)). 
83. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 697-723. 
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cannot be enforced in court against those on whom the treaty purports to 
impose a duty, by those for whose benefit the treaty imposes the duty. In 
my view, the understanding of the concept of law reflected in this posi-
tion is well-founded. I conclude that the Supreme Court cases recogniz-
ing that certain treaties are non-self-executing involve relatively un-
problematic exceptions from, or refinements of, that understanding of 
the concept of law.84 Nevertheless, the treatymakers, with the help of 
some lower courts, have been pushing the doctrinal envelope in a direc-
tion that exacerbates the tension between the judicial doctrine and the 
Supremacy Clause. Although exactly what they have been doing is dis-
puted, on one view, they have been entering into treaties and purporting 
to deny them the force of domestic law by attaching to them a declaration 
that the treaty is non-self-executing. With respect to certain treaties, in 
other words, the treatymakers have arguably purported to countermand 
the ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause. 
The doctrine as reflected in these declarations is clearly in tension 
with the Supremacy Clause's text. If the treatymakers have the power to 
deny a treaty the force of domestic law in this way, then not "all" treaties 
of the United States are the law of the land. The Supremacy Clause be-
comes a default rule, subject to reversal through the acts of the 
treatymakers. 
If the doctrine is in this respect in tension with the clause, the ques-
tion arises: Which should give way, the text or the doctrine? In other 
words, should we adjust our understanding of the text, or should we re-
ject this aspect of the doctrine? Answ·ering this question requires a theory 
of constitutional interpretation. Some scholars have insisted that the 
practice of declaring treaties to be non-self-executing is unconstitutional, 
and the declarations invalid, because it conflicts with the text of the 
Supremacy Clause.85 Unlike these scholars, I accept the authoritativeness 
in certain circumstances of judicial precedent that deviates from the text. 
Despite the apparent tension with the text, I acknowledge that the treaty-
makers have the power to countermand the ordinary operation of the 
Supremacy Clause because, on my analysis, this power falls within the 
broad contours of Supreme Court decisions on the self-execution 
doctrine. 
This recognition gives some surface plausibility to Professor Yoo's 
reading (out) of the Supremacy Clause, as it problematizes a literal inter-
pretation of that clause. The concession does not help Professor Yoo 
nearly enough, however. Acceptance of a doctrine that deviates some-
what from the text does not justify reading that text entirely out of the 
Constitution. The philosophy reflected in the aphorism "in for a dime, in 
84. See id. 
85. See Thomas Burgenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 
Colum.J. Transnat'l L. 211, 222 & n.36 (1997);JordanJ. Paust, Customary International 
Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law in the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301, 
324-35 (1999). 
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for a dollar" has no place in constitutional interpretation. (If it did, we 
would have little of the constitutional text left to work with.) The inter-
pretive methodology 1 have followed strives to salvage as much as possible 
of both text and judicial precedent. The non-self-execution doctrine, as 
recognized in Supreme Court decisions, goes only so far as to permit the 
treatymakers to countermand the Supremacy Clause's effects. The 
clause's declaration that treaties have the force of domestic law remains 
the default rule. The cases support a presumption that treaties are the 
law of the land and self-executing. Even if they did not, the fact that they 
do not conflict with such a presumption should be enough to require its 
adoption on textual grounds. But judicial precedent requires, at most, 
the acceptance of a power to countermand the ordinary operation of the 
Supremacy Clause. To the extent Professor Yoo would go beyond that, 
his position is doctrinally unsupported and, because textually implausi-
ble, must be rejected. 
In this Part, I first discuss why the concept of a non-self-executing 
treaty is regarded by Professor Yoo and others as lacking the force of 
domestic law. I then consider whether the Supreme Court cases recog-
nizing the category of non-self-executing treaties can be reconciled with 
the Supremacy Clause's text. In this regard, I summarize my claim that 
the doctrine in fact encompasses four distinct types of reasons why a valid 
law might not be judicially enforceable. I include here a discussion of the 
treatymakers' recent practice of declaring certain treaties to be non-self-
executing, and a brief explanation of my acceptance of their power to do 
so through a reservation. In the following Section, I consider the plausi-
bility of the various alternative positions Professor Yoo appears to 
espouse. 
A. The Concept of a Non-Self-Executing Treaty 
At a general level, a treaty-like any law-may be said to be non-self-
executing when it does not accomplish its aims of its own force. 
Although it can arise in other contexts, the question of a treaty's status 
usually arises when someone tries to invoke a treaty in a court. A treaty 
that is non-self-executing, as the Restatement defines that concept, is sim-
ply not enforceable in the courts. 86 It is easy to see why the Restatement 
86. See Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § ll1 (3), (4) (1987). The term has 
sometimes been used by the lower courts in a broader sense to include treaties that do not 
create a private right of action. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719. As I 
have written elsewhere, the term "non-self-executing" is ambiguous enough to encompass 
such treaties, but a treaty that is non-self-executing in this sense may still be enforceable in 
the courts in certain circumstances. See id. at 720. The Restatement's conclusion that 
non-self-executing treaties are not the law of the land is plausible only because it takes the 
position that "the question of a treaty's self-executing nature is distinct from the question 
whether it creates a cause of action." Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111 cmt. h 
(1987). Professor Yoo approves of the cases equating the self-execution issue with the right 
of action issue. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1972-73. His position that non-self-
executing treaties lack domestic legal force may suggest that he thinks that a treaty that 
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would go on to describe such a treaty as lacking the force of domestic law. 
The role of the courts in our system of government is to resolve disputes 
in accordance with law. Indeed, the Supremacy Clause expressly instructs 
state judges to give effect to treaties notwithstanding anything in state 
constitutions or laws. Yet a non-self-executing treaty is not cognizable in 
the courts, state or federal. It does not, for example, preempt state laws 
or provide a defense in a criminal or civil proceeding. The position that 
a non-self-executing treaty lacks domestic legal force thus reflects an un-
derstanding of the concept of law which ties a norm's legal status to its 
enforceability in court against those upon whom the law purports to im-
pose an obligation, by those for whose benefit the law imposes the obliga-
tion. The position also reflects the related notion that a law requires a 
sanction87-that is, that the legal system must make some provision for 
enforcing legal norms against the duty-holder. Elsewhere, I elaborate 
and offer a qualified defense of these conceptions of what it means for a 
norm to have the force of law. 88 
1. The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties.89 - Notwithstanding 
the Supremacy Clause, our courts have long recognized that some trea-
ties are not enforceable in the courts because they are non-self-executing. 
In a prior article, I considered the compatibility of this doctrine with the 
Supremacy Clause and concluded that this "doctrine" actually encom-
passes four distinct types of reasons why a treaty might legitimately be 
considered judicially unenforceable.90 As long as the four doctrines are 
confined to their proper scope, they are tolerably compatible with the 
Supremacy Clause's designation of treaties as law. But, like the analogous 
doctrine under which certain constitutional provisions are said to raise 
political questions, this doctrine should be regarded as problematic pre-
cisely because, if broadly construed, it is in tension with the conviction 
does not create a private right of action is not judicially enforceable in any circumstances. 
If offered as a description of current doctrine, his claim is inaccurate. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. 
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191 (1961) (relying on treaty as defense to state action to take 
property);Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 130 (1928) (relying on treaty to obtain writ of 
mandamus requiring action by state official); Asakura v. City of Seatde, 265 U.S. 332, 343 
(1924) (relying on treaty to obtain restraining order preventing application of state law 
that violated treaty). If offered as a proposal for doctrinal evolution, the suggestion makes 
no sense. See infra text accompanying notes 172-173. In discussing the claim that a treaty 
that is non-self-executing lacks the force of domestic law, I will use the term "non-self-
executing" to refer only to non-self-executing treaties that are not judicially enforceable 
under any circumstances. 
87. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
88. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Constitution as Law of the Land: The 
Supremacy Clause and Judicial Review (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) [hereinafter Vazquez, Constitution as Law of the Land]. 
89. I discuss the four categories of non-self-executing treaties here in a different order 
than in "The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties." To avoid confusion, I shall 
refrain from referring to the doctrines by reference to the order in which I have discussed 
them (e.g., the first category, second category, etc.). 
90. See generally Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8. 
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that law is judicially enforceable by the individuals whose rights it pur-
ports to govern. The Supreme Court's self-execution decisions, like its 
political question decisions, can and should be read to construe our Con-
stitution to establish a presumption of judicial enforceability. 
a. Unconstitutional Treaties. - One of the four categories of non-self. 
executing treaties consists of treaties that purport to accomplish what is 
beyond the powers of the treatymakers under our Constitution. Such 
treaties may be said to lack the force of domestic law for the same reason 
unconstitutional statutes are thought to lack such force. To the extent 
they purport to accomplish what is beyond the treatymaking power, they 
are invalid. 
A treaty might in theory be invalid because it purports to do some-
thing that neither the federal nor state governments may do under our 
Constitution. A treaty that restricts the freedom of speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment would be an example. Such a treaty is 
void as a matter of domestic law. Other treaties may attempt to accom-
plish something that is within the power of the federal government but 
beyond the power of the treatymakers. Such treaties are unconstitutional 
because they intrude upon the exclusive powers of the legislature. They 
purport to do what, under our Constitution, can only be accomplished 
through a statute. These treaties might be, and have been, described as 
"non-self-executing. "91 They are in force internationally, but because of 
the way our Constitution divides powers between the treatymakers and 
the lawmakers, they cannot accomplish their goals of their own force. 
They require implementation. 
One example of something that, under our Constitution, can only be 
done by statute is the appropriation of money. During the Jay Treaty 
debates, everyone assumed that an appropriatiotl. would require action by 
the House. The debate was about whether the House was duty-bound to 
appropriate the money simply because the treaty was the law of the land, 
or instead had discretion to decline to appropriate the money if it ob-
jected to the treaty. The latter position has prevailed, a position that in-
deed seems to follow from the premise that an appropriation requires a 
law. The idea that the legislature can be legally bound to enact legisla-
tion is foreign to us.92 In any event, any such "duty" would be wholly 
unenforceable. To say that the House is under a duty to appropriate the 
money and that, if it does not, it can be ordered to do so, is to trivialize 
the requirement of House action. And to recognize that the "duty" is 
unenforceable is to trivialize the duty. 
If we reconcile treaties that purport to appropriate money with the 
Supremacy Clause by regarding them as unconstitutional, it would ap-
pear to follow that the treatymakers are legally bound not to conclude 
91. For a more thorough discussion of these types of treaties, see Vazquez, Four 
Doctrines, supra note 8, at 718-19. 
92. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 972 n.1 (1997) (Souter,J., dissenting). 
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such treaties, at least not before obtaining the necessary appropriation 
from the House. That we instead say only that the treaty is non-self-exe-
cuting reflects the same view about the nature of a legal obligation that 
underlies the statement that a non-self-executing treaty is not the law of 
the land-that is, it reflects the conviction that a supposed duty not en-
forceable against the duty-holder, either judicially or otherwise, is not 
truly a legal duty. Perhaps if the impeachment power had come to be 
used against Presidents who entered into such treaties, the idea that the 
President lacks the constitutional power to conclude such treaties might 
have taken root. 9 3 In any event, a President who knows that appropria-
tions require action by the House would presumably not enter into a 
treaty purporting to appropriate money (and the Jay Treaty did not pur-
port to do so94). A prudent President would refrain from entering into 
an unconditional obligation to do something that requires an appropria-
tion without getting the House's approval beforehand. He would be 
more likely to agree to "propose" action to the Congress, to "use his best 
efforts" to achieve the desired ends, or to attach a reservation or declara-
tion alerting the other parties to the constitutional role of the House. 
Treaties phrased in any of those ways would not be unconstitutional, but 
they would fall into one or more of the other categories of non-self-exe-
cuting treaties. 
b. Nonjusticiable Treaties. - Like the previous category, the next cate-
gory of non-self-executing treaties reflects separation-of-powers notions. 
This category, however, reflects the Constitution's allocation of powers 
among the branches of our federal government with respect to the enforce-
ment, rather than the making, of treaties. This category consists of trea-
ties that are not judicially enforceable because they establish a type of 
obligation whose enforcement our Constitution allocates to a branch 
other than the judiciary. As noted, our legal tradition recognizes a link 
between law and courts. Thus, by declaring treaties to be law, the 
Supremacy Clause appears to allocate their enforcement to the courts. 
But our legal tradition also recognizes certain limits on the judicial en-
forceability of laws. The courts are regarded as the proper enforcers of 
certain types of norms but not others. 
The most pertinent limitation can be traced to Marbury v. Madison: 
"The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individu-
als."95 A treaty, therefore, is notjudicially enforceable if it does not con-
93. Given the requirement of Senate consent to treaties, however, it is easy to see why 
this power was never used in this way. 
94. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 
116, 120. 
95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). The courts, of course, decide on the rights of 
individuals whether such individuals are plaintiffs or defendants. That is why the Marbury 
dictum is not in conflict with the fact that courts often enforce public rights at the behest 
of government, for example in criminal cases. Even in such cases, it may be said that the 
role of the court is to protect the rights of individuals. The rights of the public (as 
distinguished from the individual) could in theory be enforced without the involvement of 
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fer rights.96 A treaty does not confer a right if it does not impose an 
obligation. This is why a precatory or hortatory treaty is not judicially 
enforceable. Such treaties are sometimes said to be non-self-executing,97 
but the label in this context signifies something very different from what 
it means in the case of an unconstitutional treaty. There is nothing in the 
Constitution that prevents the treatymak.ers from entering into treaties 
with precatory or aspirational provisions. 
That the courts may not enforce such provisions is not problematic. 
Such treaties might be said to impose obligations of a sort, just as the 
Constitution's preamble might be said to obligate the Congress to seek to 
"promote the general welfare." But, in both cases, the "obligations" are 
not thought to create correlative legal rights. They might be described as 
moral obligations. Determining how to implement an aspirational provi-
sion requires the balancing of a number of competing demands on our 
resources, and this sort of balancing is something our Constitution as-
signs to the legislative branch. The formal conclusion that such provi-
sions do not create legal "rights" might be thought to reflect this division 
of powers among the branches of the federal government. 
Precatory provisions might be regarded as part of a broader category 
of nonjusticiable provisions. Another type of nonjusticiable provision 
consists of those that are too vague for judicial enforcement. Like consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, a treaty may be judicially unenforceable 
because it does not offer "judicially manageable standards."98 The formal 
and functional reasons for concluding that such provisions are not en-
forceable in the courts are similar to the rationales for finding precatory 
provisions to be non-self-executing. A vague treaty provision does not 
courts, but such enforcement is too likely to trample the rights of individuals. It is to 
protect the latter that the executive is required to resort to courts if it seeks to deprive 
people of liberty or property. 
96. This principle has produced a great deal of confusion among the lower courts 
with respect to the standing of individuals to enforce treaties in the courts. Some courts 
have denied relief to individuals based on the notion that treaties, as a matter of 
international law, confer rights only on states. Of course, if this were relevant, treaties 
would never-or virtually never-be enforceable by individuals in our courts. I have 
argued elsewhere that as a matter of international law individuals generally lack "rights" 
under treaties only in the sense that they generally lack standing to enforce the correlative 
obligations of states at the international plane. The Supremacy Clause's declaration that 
treaties are domestic law was desigued to make treaties enforceable at the domestic plane. 
Since the role of the courts at the domestic plane is to enforce the rights of individuals, the 
Supremacy Clause is best read to give individuals standing to enforce treaties that obligate 
the state to treat them in a given way. See generally Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra 
note 8, at 1133-41. Thankfully, there is no need to address the standing issue here. A 
treaty that is not self-executing, as Professor Yoo uses the term, is not enforceable in the 
courts at the behest of anyone, presumably including other nations. I invoke Chief Justice 
Marshall's dictum about the role of the courts only insofar as it tells us, indirectly, that a 
treaty is not judicially enforceable if it does not establish obligations. 
97. See, e.g., INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 429 n.22 (1984) (stating that Article 34 of 
Refugee Convention is "precatory and not self-executing"). 
98. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962). 
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"prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may 
be determined."99 It leaves the parties with much discretion about how 
to comply, and in our system of government it is for the legislature to 
exercise that discretion. 
It may be that even certain mandatory and determinate treaty provi-
sions are nonjusticiable as a constitutional matter. Analogously, the polit-
ical-question doctrine is said to reflect the idea that the enforcement of 
certain constitutional norms has been allocated by the Constitution to a 
branch other than the judiciary.100 Sometimes the conclusion that the 
Constitution allocates the enforcement of a constitutional provision to 
the nonjudicial branches is based on the precatory or vague nature of the 
norm, but sometimes it is based on constitutional text10I or structure.I02 
It cannot be said that the Constitution allocates the enforcement of trea-
ties generally to a branch other than the judiciary, but perhaps a court 
could legitimately construe the Constitution to place treaties concerning 
certain subjects-arms control, for example-beyond the enforcement 
power of the courts. Alternatively, the unenforceability of such treaties 
might be explained by the more general principle 1 traced above to Mar-
bury v. Madison: An arms-control treaty might be said to be judicially un-
enforceable because it does not confer rights on individuals, as individu-
als are not its objects.I03 
This is not the place to explore the outer boundaries of this category 
of non-self-executing treaties. What is important for present purposes is 
to recognize that this category includes treaties that are not judicially en-
forceable because of the way our constitution allocates the power to en-
force treaties that are validly concluded by the treatymakers. Like the 
political question doctrine, this category of non-self-executing treaties 
should be regarded as an exception to the general rule that laws are judi-
cially enforceable.l04 
99. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). 
100. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 218-29; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 
118, 140-51 (1912). 
101. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
102. The nonjusticiability of disputes about whether the constitutional norms 
regulating the amendment process have been complied with has been defended on 
structural grounds. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A 
Functional Analysis, 75 Yale LJ. 517, 596 (1966); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 
457-60 (1939) (Black,J., concurring). 
103. Explaining the nonjusticiability of such treaties on this ground would mean 
extracting from the Marbury dictum the principle that domestic courts do not enforce the 
rights of sovereign states. Cf. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 11-12, Republic of 
Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770) (arguing that foreign states 
lack standing to maintain actions under treaties in domestic courts). But see Brief Amicus 
Curiae of a Group of Law Professors at 5-6, id. (disputing U.S. brief). 
104. Professor Yoo argues that separation-of-powers notions require the conclusion 
that treaties always, or presumptively, are judicially unenforceable in the absence of 
implementing legislation. I address these separation-of-powers arguments in Part IV. 
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c. Treaties Addressed to the Legislature. - The foregoing categories of 
non-self-executing treaties are simply versions of doctrines that apply 
equally to constitutional and statutory provisions. To the extent the term 
"non-self-executing" describes a doctrine unique to treaties, it refers to 
what I have called the "intent-based" category.105 It consists of treaties 
that are addressed to the legislature in the sense that the obligation they 
impose is an obligation to pass domestic legislation. 
Foster v. Neilson is the prototype of this category.106 At issue in that 
case was whether a treaty between the United States and Spain ratified 
and confirmed certain Spanish grants of land of its own force or instead 
required the United States to "pass acts" (i.e., legislation) to ratify and 
confirm the grants.107 The Court acknowledged that, if the treaty had 
provided that the grants were "hereby" confirmed, it would have been 
self-executing and would accordingly have governed the question of ti-
tle.Ios But the Court read the treaty as "stipulating for some future legis-
lative act. "109 The Court relied on the English text, which provided that 
the grants "shall be ratified and confirmed. "110 It read this language as 
contemplating a future act of ratification. In a later case involving the 
same treaty, United States v. Percheman,111 the Court confessed error. This 
time, the Court had before it the Spanish text, which said that the treaties 
"shall remain ratified and confirmed. "112 This, the Court held, was the 
language of self-execution. 
Foster recognizes that a treaty is not self-executing if the obligation it 
imposes is an obligation to enact domestic legislation. It is important to 
distinguish this category from the two categories discussed earlier. The 
determination that a treaty is non-self-executing because unconstitutional 
or nonjusticiable turns on an interpretation of the Constitution. The first 
reflects the conclusion that the treaty was invalidly made; the second the 
conclusion that the treaty, though validly made, imposes an obligation 
whose enforcement our Constitution allocates to nonjudicial branches. 
In Foster, by contrast, the self-execution question turned on an interpreta-
tion of the treaty. Treaties that fall in the first two categories may be said to 
be "addressed to the legislature," but only constructively. The necessity 
for legislative action is a consequence of a constitutional disability (in the 
first case, a disability of the treatymakers; in the second case, a disability 
of the courts). The Foster category consists of treaties that are actually 
addressed to the legislature. The content of the obligation imposed by 
the treaty is the enactment of legislation. According to Foster, such trea-
105. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 700-10. 
106. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
107. ld. at 314. 
108. ld. at 314-15. 
109. This characterization of the holding comes from the later case of United States v. 
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833). 
110. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315. 
111. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
112. ld. at 88. 
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ties are not enforceable in the courts. With respect to such treaties, the 
role of the courts is merely to enforce the statute passed by the legislature 
to implement the treaty.113 
d. Treaties That Do Not Create Private Rights of Action. -Increasingly, 
lower courts have been using the term "non-self-executing" to refer to 
treaties that do not themselves create a private right of action.114 The 
Restatement, on the other hand, insists that the self-execution issue is 
distinct from the question whether a treaty creates a private right of ac-
tion.115 It is true that the doctrine recognized in Foster does not have to 
do with the existence of a private right of action. The plaintiff in Foster 
had invoked a right of action at common law; he relied on the treaty 
merely to establish his title to the property. But I have attempted to show 
that, outside the treaty context, courts often use the term "self-executing" 
(and hence "non-self-executing") to refer to laws that do not create reme-
dies or rights of action.116 Once it is recognized that the term "non-seU: 
executing" is not a term of art restricted to treaty law, but instead refers to 
a number of possible reasons why a law might not be judicially enforcea-
ble without prior legislative implementation, there is little reason to deny 
the label to treaties that contemplate but do not create a private right of 
action. Constitutional provisions, for example, have frequently been de-
scribed as self-executing (or not) with respect to remedies.117 
There is, however, an important difference between treaties that are 
non-self-executing in the first three senses of the term and treaties that 
are non-self-executing in this fourth sense. In the first three cases, a non-
self-executing treaty is not judicially enforceable under any circum-
stances. A treaty that is non-self-executing in the fourth sense is judicially 
unenforceable only when it is invoked by someone who seeks to maintain 
an action and has no other legal source for his right of action. Someone 
who invokes a treaty as a defense does not need a right of action.118 Ad-
113. Professor Yoo erroneously attributes to Professor Henkin an excessively narrow 
understanding of the concept of a non-self-executing treaty. He says that Professor Henkin 
wonld recognize a treaty as non-self-executing only if it imposes on the parties the 
obligation to accomplish through future legislative action something that the Constitution 
exclusively assigns to Congress. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1977. Professor Yoo 
thus suggests that Professor Henkin would regard as self-executing a promise of future 
legislative action on a matter not exclusively assigned by the Constitution to Congress, or a 
treaty on a matter exclusively assigned to Congress that is not framed as a promise of future 
legislative action. Professor Henkin has never taken such a position. See Henkin, supra 
note 8, at 203. 
114. See, e.g., Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Bent-8antana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J., concurring). 
115. See Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111 cmt. h (1987). 
116. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 721. 
117. See Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (1969). 
118. For example, if Texas makes conduct X a crime, and a treaty provides that the 
parties shall not regard conduct X as a crime, someone being prosecuted in Texas for 
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ditionally, it is unnecessary to rely on a treaty as the source of a private 
right of action if another law provides a private right of action. For exam-
ple, someone seeking damages or an injunction against a state official 
who has allegedly violated a treaty may rely on Section 1983 for his right 
of action.119 Someone who seeks an injunction ordering a federal official 
to stop violating a treaty may rely on the Administrative Procedure Act for 
his right of action.120 As Foster illustrates, historically treaties were not 
relied upon as the source of the plaintiff's right of action. The treaty 
governed the rights and duties of the parties, but the common law pro-
vided the right of action. 
The lower court opinions most frequently cited for the proposition 
that a non-self-executing treaty is one that does not create a "private right 
of action" were written in cases in which the treaty was being invoked by a 
plaintiff suing a private individual or a foreign state in circumstances in 
which for jurisdictional reasons, there was a need to find a federal right 
of action. In such circumstances, there may in fact have been a need to 
determine whether the treaty itself conferred a right of action. Unfortu-
nately, the dictum in these cases-to the effect that a treaty that does not 
create a right of action is non-self-executing-has been ·wrenched from its 
context and applied in cases in which there should have been no need to 
ask whether the treaty itself created a right of action.121 
2. Are Non-Self-Executing Treaties "Law"? - As the foregoing analysis 
suggests, there is no single answer to the question whether a non-self-
executing treaty is "law." A treaty that is non-self-executing because it 
does not create a private right of action is plainly "la·w" under even the 
narrowest definition of that term. Not all laws create private rights of 
action; a treaty that does not create a private right of action may still be 
enforced in court in certain circumstances. On the other hand, a treaty 
that is non-self-executing because it is unconstitutional may unproblemat-
ically be described as not law. To the extent it exceeds the treatymaking 
power, it is invalid. Treaty provisions that are nonjusticiable because they 
are precatory or aspirational might be said to be law, but the characteriza-
tion is not meaningful because of the provision's content: It does not 
purport to obligate the parties to do anything in particular. The same 
might be said of treaty provisions that are nonjusticiable because they are 
vague.l22 
conduct X should be able to rely on the treaty as a defense, even if the treaty does not 
create a private right of action. 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (permitting suits against state officials for violations of 
federal Constitution or laws). 
120. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (establishing judicial review of legal wrongs caused by 
federal agency action). 
121. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719. 
122. To the extent a mandatory and determinate treaty proVISion is deemed 
nonjusticiable for other separation-of:.powers reasons, the question of its status as law is 
more complicated. 
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Whether a treaty "addressed to the legislature" is law is a more com-
plex question. An example will aid our analysis. Consider a treaty that 
provides: "Do not deport refugees."123 (I shall hereinafter refer to this as 
a Type A treaty.) If the relevant concepts (e.g., "deport" and "refugee") 
are sufficiently determinate, such a provision would be self-executing on 
my analysis. Upon the entry into force of the treaty, by virtue of the treaty 
itself (and the Supremacy Clause), the corpus of federal law in the 
United States would include a norm prohibiting the deportation of refu-
gees. Now assume a treaty that provides instead: "Pass legislation prohib-
iting the deportation of refugees" (hereinafter a Type B treaty).l24 Such 
a treaty is plainly non-self-executing under Foster. Although the treaty 
contemplates the creation of a domestic-law norm identical to the one 
created by the first treaty, such a norm does not become part of the 
corpus of federal law by virtue of the entry into force of the treaty. In-
deed, one might say that a Type B treaty is non-self-executing because it 
does not, of its own force, create a Type A law. 
But what about the norm addressed to the legislature? Is the norm 
"Pass a law barring the deportation of refugees" part of the corpus of 
federal law in the United States by virtue of the entry into force of the 
treaty? The text of the Supremacy Clause would appear to require an 
affirmative answer. Yet, it is also clear that this norm is not enforceable in 
court. The norm can be violated by the legislature with impunity. 
Whether we regard such a norm as law depends on how we define law. 
The norm would not be law if we linked the legal status of a duty to its 
judicial enforceability or the existence of some other mechanism for en-
forcing it against the duty-holder. Professor Henkin, on the other hand, 
argues that such norms are indeed law: 
Whether [a treaty] is self-executing or not, it is supreme law of 
the land. If it is not self-executing, Marshall said, it is not "a rule 
for the Court"; he did not suggest that it is not law for the Presi-
dent or for Congress. It is their obligation to see to it that it is 
faithfully implemented; it is their obligation to do what is neces-
sary to make it a rule for the courts if the treaty requires that it 
be a rule for the courts .... 125 
Professor Henkin thus reconciles the concept of a non-self-executing 
treaty with the Supremacy Clause by embracing a broader conception of 
"law." 
Professor Henkin's rationale for reconciling a non-self-executing 
treaty with the Supremacy Clause is unavailable to Professor Yoo, how-
ever. First, a non-self-executing treaty, as Professor Yoo understands the 
123. More likely the treaty would provide that all parties agree not to deport refugees. 
The provision quoted in the text is the equivalent for purposes of analyzing the self-
execution question. 
124. Again, the treaty is more likely to provide that all parties agree to pass legislation 
prohibiting the deportation of refugees. 
125. Henkin, supra note 8, at 203-04. 
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term, would not be law even under Professor Henkin's less demanding 
test. Even if one were to grant for purposes of argument that a norm can 
be law even though it can be violated by the duty holder without legal 
consequences, surely one would have to insist that such a norm is law only 
if it is binding on the duty holder. Professor Henkin can describe such a 
norm as law because he insists that the Congress is legally bound to com-
ply with it. Professor Yoo, on the other hand, forthrightly defends his 
thesis by arguing that the political branches should have the flexibility to 
violate the norm. 126 This position is not entirely implausible. If the Consti-
tution requires action by Congress to implement a non-self-executing 
treaty of the type hypothesized above, then presumably it does so for a 
reason. In the case of a treaty that is non-self-executing solely because it 
is framed as a requirement of legislation,127 it is plausible to conclude 
that the reason is to leave Congress the legal option of violating it. But, if 
Professor Yoo's position is that treaties are not even theoretically binding 
on the nonjudicial branches, treaties would not be law in even the least 
demanding sense of that term. 
Second, a looser understanding of the term "law" does not help Pro-
fessor Yoo because he does not restrict the concept of a non-self-execut-
ing treaty to Type B treaties. He would regard Type A treaties as non-self-
executing, either categorically or presumptively. This position is in con-
flict with the Supremacy Oause, no matter how we interpret the term 
"law." According to the terms of that clause, the entry into force of a 
treaty norm having the content "Do not deport refugees" results in the 
existence of a domestic law norm having the same content. Professor Yoo 
denies this. He insists instead that the entry into force of a treaty norm 
having the content "Do not deport refugees" results in the existence, at 
best, of a domestic law norm having the content "Pass legislation prohibit-
ing the deportation of refugees." A less demanding definition of "law" 
helps Professor Henkin explain why a treaty having the content "Pass leg-
islation prohibiting the deportation of refugees" is law even though it is 
unenforceable; such a definition cannot explain why a treaty having the 
content "Do not deport refugees" should be treated as a law having the 
content "Pass laws prohibiting the deportation of refugees." Professor 
Yoo would find the authority for treating the former as the latter in the 
Constitution, yet the most relevant thing the Constitution says on the 
matter is that a treaty having the content "Do not deport refugees" is itself 
law. 
Unlike Professor Henkin, I am inclined to question the status as 
"law" of a norm that can be disregarded with no legal consequences. It is 
126. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979. 
127. As noted above, the categories of non-self-execution might overlap, and thus a 
treaty that expressly contemplates future acts oflegislation might do so because the parties 
regarded the provision as precatory or vague. A treaty would be non-self-executing solely 
because it is framed as a requirement of future legislation if it is not also precatory or 
vague. 
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for this reason that I argue the Supremacy Clause provides textual sup-
port for a presumption that treaties are self-executing (a presumption 
that finds independent support in the cases). But the question whether a 
Type B treaty is law is less interesting, and less pertinent, than the ques-
tion whether a Type A treaty should be treated as a Type B law. That 
Professor Henkin is willing to regard a Type B treaty as law even though it 
is not judicially enforceable does not mean that he would find it un-
problematic to say that a Type A treaty is law even though it is judicially 
unenforceable. He might take the position that treaties are law only if 
they bind the norm subject. In the case of a Type B treaty, the norm-
subjects are the legislature and the executive (in its lawmaking capacity). 
In the case of our hypothesized Type A treaty, the norm subjects would 
be any government officials involved in deporting people-the executive 
(in its law executing capacity) and the courts. Professor Henkin might 
take the position that a Type A treaty would be law only if the executive 
were bound as a matter of domestic law to refrain from deporting refu-
gees, and the courts were bound in a deportation proceeding against a 
refugee to rule that the deportation is prohibited. He might accordingly 
take the position that the Supremacy Clause requires that "all" Type A 
treaties be binding on judges to the extent they purport to address the 
rights of individuals before the court. 
There is much force in this analysis, but an examination of the treaty-
makers' recent practice of attaching non-self-executing declarations to 
human-rights treaties leads me to conclude that the treatymakers do have 
the power to enter into a Type A treaty obligation that is not binding on 
judges and other law-applying officials. Although the purpose of these 
declarations is a matter of some dispute, on one view these declarations 
seek to render non-self-executing a treaty provision that othenvise would 
be self-executing.128 What the declarations mean by "self-executing" is 
also unclear. The Senate Reports attached to some of the treaties indi-
cate that the declarations mean merely that the treaty does not create 
private rights of action, 129 thus leaving open the possibility that the treaty 
may be enforced defensively or pursuant to generic rights of action, like 
the APA or section 1983. With respect to other treaties, however, the 
Senate Reports indicate that the declarations mean that the treaty lacks 
the force of domestic law.130 It is possible, then, that by attaching the 
declaration to the treaty, the treatymakers intended to deny domestic 
legal force to a treaty that would othenvise be self-executing in every 
128. Scholars have argued, however, that the declarations were not intended to be 
binding on the courts. See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human 
Rights: Non-Self:.Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. lnt'l L. 
129, 135-36 (1999). 
129. See, e.g., S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992) (International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights); see also S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-29, at 8 (1994) (International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination). 
130. See, e.g., S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 10 (1990) (Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). 
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sense of the term. If this were the treatymakers' intent, the declarations 
may be characterized as an attempt to countermand for a given treaty the 
rule that the Supremacy Clause would otherwise establish. 
Some scholars maintain that, if the declarations do purport to coun-
termand the Supremacy Clause, they are unconstitutional.131 Professor 
Henkin's position is less clear. He has called the practice of attaching 
such declarations to treaties "anti-Constitutional"132-an unconventional 
term that he may be using advisedly to denote something other than un-
constitutional. Iss I agree that the practice is contrary to the spirit that 
animated the Supremacy Clause. It certainly conflicts with the evident 
desire of the Founders to "show the world" that we take our treaty com-
mitments seriously by making them enforceable in the ordinary courts.134 
Contrary to Professor Yoo's suggestion,135 however, I have never taken 
the position that such declarations are invalid.136 
It is unnecessary for present purposes to resolve the interpretive or 
constitutional issues surrounding these declarations. It suffices to con-
sider instead the constitutionality of a hypothetical "non-self-executing" 
reservation attached to a treaty that would otherwise clearly be self-exe-
cuting. By hypothesizing a reservation rather than a declaration, we 
avoid the issues stemming from the uncertain effect of declarations on 
the international obligations established by the treaty. To avoid the ambi-
guities surrounding the intended meaning of the declarations, I shall as-
sume that the reservation clearly states that the treaty "~oes not have the 
force of domestic law." Would such a reservation be valid and effective? 
If one accepts Foster, then in my view one must accept the validity and 
effectiveness of such a reservation. Foster held that the treatymakers could 
render an otherwise self-executing norm non-self-executing by framing it 
as a requirement of future legislation. Thus, the contemplated domestic 
law norm "Do not deport refugees" is denied effect as domestic law if it is 
embedded in a provision framed as "Pass legislation barring the deporta-
tion of refugees." The same result must follow if the "non-self-execution" 
provision appears in a separate part of the treaty. Thus, Article 1 of a 
treaty, which considered alone would be self-executing, can be denied 
domestic legal force by Article 27 of the treaty, which provides that "the 
requirements of Articles 1-26 shall be achieved through future acts of 
domestic lawmaking." Assuming the other parties to the treaty do not 
131. See Burgenthal, supra note 85, at 222 & n.36; Paust, supra note 85, at 324-25. 
132. Henkin, supra note 8, at 202. 
133. See Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 63 (1990) 
(arguing that such declarations are misguided). But cf. Henkin, supra note 8, at 477 n.100 
("[I]f what I wrote [in a previous article] can be read to support a general policy of 
declaring all treaties, or a category of treaties, to be non-self-executing, I do not hold that 
view."). 
134. James W!lson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), 
in 2 Documentary History, supra note 14, at 514, 518. 
135. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1959. 
136. See, in particular, Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 708 n.61. 
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object to it, the identical statement in a reservation to the treaty would 
have exactly the same effect as hypothetical Article 27, assuming the res-
ervation is not contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty.137 In my 
view, such a reservation would rarely, if ever, be contrary to the object 
and purpose of a treaty.138 If another party does object to the reserva-
tion, then the treaty is not in force between the reserving and the ob-
jecting parties, 139 and the treaty would lack domestic legal force because 
it lacks international force. If at least one other party fails to object, the 
treaty would come into force subject to the reservation. The result would 
be the existence of a Type A treaty obligation-binding and in force 
under international law-that would lack the force of domestic law and 
would accordingly not be binding on domestic law-applying officials, such 
as judges. 
If my analysis is correct, then treatymakers have the power to deprive 
Type A treaties of domestic legal force, absent implementing legislation. 
They can do this by making non-self-execution an unseverable part of the 
United States' ratification of the treaty. If so, then the Supremacy Clause 
in the end functions as a default rule. 140 It makes treaty provisions judi-
cially enforceable, if valid and othenvise justiciable, unless the 
treatymakers themselves affirmatively determine otherwise (and manifest 
that intent in the constitutionally appropriate way). A strict textualist 
might object that this construction is unfaithful to the Supremacy 
Clause's text, which makes "all" treaties the law of the land. But the op-
posite conclusion, in my view, would require the rejection of too much 
entrenched doctrine to be plausible. This critique, in any event, is un-
available to Professor Yoo, whose various alternative constructions of the 
Constitution would represent far greater inroads onto the rule estab-
lished by the Supremacy Clause's text. 
137. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37. 
138. Such a reservation does nothing more than establish for the United States the 
rule that applies in other countries (such as the United Kingdom) by virtue of their 
constitutions-i.e., that the treaty will not have the force of domestic law until legislatively 
implemented. If such a provision were contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty, the 
U.K. could never become a party to the treaty. 
139. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 20, 1155 
U.N.T.S. at 337. 
140. Professor Yoo writes that, on his reading, "[t]he provision [of the Supremacy 
Clanse] requiring state judges to enforce federal law creates a default rule that would be 
triggered only if the political branches chose to enforce a treaty judicially, but had failed to 
establish any lower courts." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1980. But a default rule is one 
that does not need to be "triggered." Thus, insofar as he is arguing that a treaty always or 
presumptively requires implementation by statute, he is reading the Supremacy Clause not 
as the default rule, but as the opposite of a default rule. To the extent he is just saying that 
he reads the "state judges" portion of the Supremacy Clause as a default rule because it 
applies only if Congress fails to establish federal courts, his characterization is more 
plausible, but still not accurate. State judges continue to have jurisdiction over treaty cases 
even though Congress has created federal courts, and when they have jurisdiction, they are 
required by the Supremacy Clause to enforce treaties as law. 
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B. Yoo ~ Doctrinal Problem 
Professor Yoo does not clearly espouse any particular rule concern-
ing the domestic effect of treaties as an alternative to the prevailing view. 
Instead, he argues that the founding material is consistent with any of a 
number of possible alternative rules. In this section, I describe six alter-
native theories that Professor Yoo's article might be read to espouse, and 
I explain why each is implausible in the light of text and doctrine. 
1. First Theory: Treaties Neuer Have the Force of Domestic Law. - The 
most radical position advanced by Professor Yoo is that all treaties require 
implementing legislation. None is effective as domestic law unless and 
until Congress enacts a statute giving it such force. (As discussed above, 
this means that none have domestic force by virtue of the Constitution; if 
and when an implementing statute is passed, the statute will have the 
force of law.141) The support for this position consists of statements that 
Professor Yoo reads as indicating that the Founders regarded the 
treatymaking power as distinct from the legislative power and gave the 
treatymakers the former but not the latter.142 
This position, however, is flatly inconsistent with the Supremacy 
Clause's declaration that treaties do have the force of domestic law. It is 
also contradicted decisively by the many, many cases in which the 
Supreme Court has given effect to treaties even though they had not 
been implemented by Congress.143 This position also conflicts with such 
entrenched doctrines as the last-in-time rule, under which treaties and 
statutes are regarded as having equivalent stature and thus the last in 
time prevails. Under Professor Yoo's theory, a treaty could never prevail 
over a statute, as treaties would never have the force oflaw. Nor would it 
make any sense even to say that a statute prevails over an earlier treaty. A 
141. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. . 
142. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1966-67, 1997, 2055. Professor Yoo also 
argues that certain Framers regarded the making of domestic law as inherently legislative 
and nondelegable, see supra note 20, but since he relies on the statements of the Founders 
to this effect, I do not take him to be defending the rule described in the text on the 
ground that the Founders could not have given treaties automatic domestic legal force 
even if they had intended to do so. Cf. supra note 52. Instead, I take him to be relying on 
evidence that some Framers regarded domestic lawmaking to be inherently legislative and 
nondelegable as support for the argument that our Constitution should be construed that 
way even though the Founders may have been wrong in thinking that this power could not 
be delegated to the treatymakers in certain circumstances. See supra notes 20, 52 
(considering Yoo's discussion of statements by Wilson and Johnson at the Philadelphia 
convention). 
143. See, e.g., El AI Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 119 S. Ct. 662, 668 (1999); Eastern 
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 551 (1991); Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 
122, 123-24 (1989); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989); Air France v. Saks, 
470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 
252 (1984); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 
284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 609 (1927); Asakura v. Seattle, 
265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Holden v.Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 247 (1872); United States 
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 91 (1833). 
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statute would prevail even over a later treaty. It would in fact never be 
necessary to compare a statute and a treaty; statutes need be compared 
only to each other (and to the Constitution). ProfessorYoo's theory is in 
even greater conflict with the numerous decisions involving unimple-
mented treaties in which the Court has applied the principle that treaties 
should be construed liberally.144 In short, this position is plainly 
untenable. 
2. Second Theory: Treaties on Matters Within Article I Powers Never Have 
the Force of Domestic Law. - In the alternative, Professor Yoo advances the 
argument that treaties lack the force of domestic law if they regulate a 
matter falling within the scope of an Article I power. There are two possi-
ble versions of this position: The first would read the treatymaking power 
as being constructively limited to matters not assigned to the legislature. 
The second would concede that the treatymakers have the power to enter 
into such treaties, but would interpret the Constitution as denying such 
treaties domestic legal force until implemented. 
In form, the basis for reconciling the first version of this position 
with the Supremacy Clause's text is the same as the reason we regard 
treaties that purport to appropriate money not to be effective as law. Be-
cause the treatymaking power would not extend to matters falling within 
Article I, any treaty that does regulate such a matter lacks domestic legal 
force because it is unconstitutional. But the two examples of claimed leg-
islative exclusivity are so different in scope that they ultimately must be 
regarded as different in kind. The conclusion that a treaty may not ap-
propriate money is narrow and supported plausibly by Article l's specific 
requirement that appropriations be "made by law" (meaning presumably 
an Article I law). If everything falling within an Article I power were ex-
cluded from the treatymaking power, on the other hand, the latter power 
would be reduced virtually to nothing. Recall that Article I gives the Con-
gress the power to regulate foreign commerce, to define offenses against 
the law of nations, and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying 
into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the federal gov-
ernment or any officer thereof, presumably including the powers of the 
President in the area of foreign affairs. If treaties could not be made on 
those subjects, it is difficult to imagine what treaties could be made. In-
deed, a far more plausible case has been made that the federal govern-
ment may not do by treaty anything that falls outside the powers of the 
federal government as outlined in Article I.145 Of course, if this argu-
144. See, e.g., Stuart, 489 U.S. at 368; Domenech, 311 U.S. at 163; Factor v. 
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Nielson v.Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929); 
Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Asakura, 265 U.S. at 342 (1924); Tucker v. 
Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Chew 
Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 
487 (1879); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 241, 249 (1830). 
145. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. 
Rev. 390 (1998). 
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ment and Yoo's were accepted, the treatymaking power would be a null 
set. Although I do not agree that the treatymaking power encompasses 
only matters that fall within Article I, 146 the argument is plausible at all 
only because most treaties throughout our history have involved matters 
that plausibly fall within Article I. This, in turn, shows that the position 
Professor Yoo attributes to the Federal Farmer is not only unsupported by 
constitutional text, which places no such limits on the treatymaking 
power, but also has been decisively rejected by history and tradition. Nu-
merous Supreme Court and lower court decisions give effect to treaties 
on matters within Article I powers.147 
Professor Yoo might well respond that he is not claiming that the 
treatymakers were thought to lack the power to conclude treaties on such 
matters, but only that any such treaties were thought to lack domestic 
legal force unless and until implemented by Congress. But this argument 
would present a direct conflict with the Supremacy Clause's text. If the 
treaty were regarded as being within the treatymaking power, then under 
the Supremacy Clause it would be "the law of the land." If Professor 
Yoo's claim that it nevertheless requires legislative implementation were 
correct, then the treaties would not appear to be "law" in any recogniza-
ble sense. By his own accounting, such treaties would not even bind Con-
gress to pass the called-for legislation.148 Congress would retain the dis-
cretion to enact implementing legislation or not, just as it would if the 
Supremacy Clause had made no mention of treaties.149 There is no sup-
port in doctrine for this reading out of the Supremacy Clause. Numerous 
cases enforce treaties on matters within Article I in the absence of imple-
menting legislation.l5o 
146. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 1317, 1336-43 (1999) (discussing the scope of the Treaty Power) [hereinafter 
Vazquez, Treaty Power]. 
147. See, e.g., Tseng, 119 S. Ct. at 668 (Warsaw Convention); Royd, 499 U.S. at 533-34 
(same); Chan, 490 U.S. at 123-25 (same); Stuart, 489 U.S. at 366 (Convention Respecting 
Double Taxation); Saks, 470 U.S. at 396 (Warsaw Convention); Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 
252 (same); Domenech, 311 U.S. at 161 (Pan American Trademark Treaty); Cook v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (1924 Treaty with Great Britain); Santovincenzo, 284 U.S. at 
• 40 (Consular Convention with Italy); Ford, 273 U.S. at 618 (1924 Treaty with Great Britain); 
Holden, 84 U.S. at 247 (Treaty of Dec. 29, 1835); Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 
1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (Warsaw Convention); Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 
647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Convention Respecting Double Taxation); Blanco v. United 
States, 775 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) (Treaty of Honduras); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 
1055, 1058-59 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Panama Canal Treaty); Smith v. Canadian Pacific Ainvays, 
Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1971) (Warsaw Convention); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. 
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1956) (Convention for Fair Protection of 
Industrial Property); Master of County v. Cribben & Sexton Co., 202 F.2d 779, 783 
(C.C.P.A. 1953) (same); American Express Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cust. App. 146, 161 
(Ct. Cust. App. 1913) (Treaty with Canada). 
148. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979. 
149. See supra notes 70, 72 and accompanying text (discussing Necessary and Proper 
Clause). 
150. See cases cited supra note 147. 
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3. Third Theory: The Constitution Establishes a Presumption That Treaties 
Are Not the Law of the Land. - Perhaps in recognition of the array of cases 
that contradict the categorical rules he proffers, Professor Yoo advances 
in the alternative the claim that our Constitution should be read to em-
brace a presumption that treaties lack the force of domestic law unless 
and until implemented by Congress. lSI 
As noted above, this reading has the virtue of not reading the 
Supremacy Clause entirely out of the Constitution, as the clause would 
function as the source of the treatymakers' power to give the treaties they 
make the force of domestic law. Nevertheless, it is in conflict ·with the 
clause's text, as the provision is not written as a power-conferring provi-
sion. It would presume that a Type A treaty establishes a Type B law, 
whereas the Supremacy Clause declares Type A treaties to be themselves 
law. 
This interpretation is also unsupported by Professor Yoo's historical 
narrative. The burden of his discussion of the British practice is that the 
requirement that treaties be implemented by Parliament reflected the de-
sire to safeguard the prerogatives of the representative branch against 
executive overreaching.152 The burden of his discussion of the debates at 
the framing and the ratifying conventions was similarly the need to pro-
tect the role of the House from overreaching by the President and Sen-
ate.153 It is understandable why delegates who had this concern would 
propose to give the House a necessary role in the making or even the 
implementation of treaties.154 But it seems certain that such delegates 
would be entirely unsatisfied by a rule that would give the House such a 
role only if the President and Senate wanted them to have it (or forgot to 
address the matter). A rule that leaves it to the other branches to deter-
mine whether the House will have a role fits poorly with Professor Yoo's 
story about the perceived need to protect the people and their represent-
atives from overreaching by the less representative branches. 
Professor Yoo argues that a presumption against self-execution is 
supported by Foster. His treatment of this case, however, is a textbook 
example of how, with just a little strategic cutting and pasting, a text may 
be made to appear to stand for the opposite of what it says. Marshall 
wrote in Foster as follows: • 
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a 
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to 
be accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infra-terri-
torial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of 
the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States, a 
151. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2092. 
152. See id. at 1997-2004. 
153. See id. at 2024-26. 
154. As Professor Flaherty has shown, however, these proposals largely took the form 
of suggested amendments, thus implying that the unamended Constitution did not give 
the House such a role. See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 2123. 
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different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a 
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be re-
garded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legisla-
ture, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legisla-
tive provision.155 
The first part of that passage is obviously referring to the effect of treaties 
under international law or in countries such as Great Britain that do not 
regard treaties as having the force of law. The second part plainly states 
that the Supremacy Clause rejects that rule and "establishe[s]" a "different 
principle" in the United States. 
In an attempt to portray Foster as embracing a presumption that trea-
ties do not generally have effect as domestic law, Professor Yoo inverts the 
order of Marshall's sentences. Professor Yoo writes as follows: 
In Foster, Marshall acknowledged that the Supremacy Clause sug-
gested that all treaties were to be considered self-executing be-
cause it "declares a treaty to be the law of the land." A treaty's 
status as supreme federal law required that the courts regard the 
international agreement "as equivalent to an act of the legisla-
ture, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legisla-
tive provision." According to Marshall, however, "a treaty is, in 
its nature, a contract between t\vo nations, not a legislative act." 
As a result, a treaty does not achieve, by its own operation, "the 
object to be accomplished," but instead "is carried into execu-
tion by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the 
instrument. "156 
Inverting the order allows him to portray Marshall as suggesting that the 
British rule is an exception to the Supremacy Clause, whereas what Mar-
shall plainly says is that the Supremacy Clause was an alteration of the 
British rule. Of course, if the British rule were an exception to the 
Supremacy Clause, the Supremacy Clause would mean nothing, as under 
the British rule treaties are not regarded as law.157 
To be sure, Marshall does say that only a treaty that "operates of itself 
without the aid of any legislative provision" is equivalent to an -act of the 
legislature. But this language cannot have been meant as a reference to 
his earlier statement that a treaty "in its nature" is a contract that "does 
not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished." The latter 
language came immediately before the statement that "[i]n the United 
States, a different principle is established" by the Supremacy Clause. This 
has to mean that the rule established by the Supremacy Clause is not a 
rule under which treaties "generally" do not effect of themselves the ob-
155. Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.} 253, 314 (1829). 
156. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2087 (footnotes omitted}. 
157. Justice Iredell's opinion in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796}, is 
similarly unrecognizable from Yoo's description of it. I discuss the opinion, which Yoo 
regards as the strongest evidence for the "internationalist" position, see Yoo, Globalism, 
supra note 1, at 1981, in Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1110-13. 
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ject to be accomplished. Foster thus strongly supports a presumption that 
treaties are self-executing in the United States. 
When Marshall turned to the treaty before him, he seemed to lose 
sight of this presumption. As I have noted, Marshall's application of the 
"different principle" to the treaty·before him might be read to suggest a 
purer interpretive enterprise, uninfluenced by a presumption either for 
or against self-execution.158 But, I argued, the Court's need to reverse 
itself on this issue in Percheman, and the Court's language in the latter 
case, more than compensate for Marshall's apparent failure to heed his 
own counsel in Foster. In particular, the Court framed the issue in 
Percheman as whether the treaty "stipulat[es] for some future legislative 
act. "159 To "stipulate" for something is "to include [it] speci.ficaUy in the 
terms of an agreement, contract, etc.; to arrange definitively. "160 Thus, if 
a non-self-executing treaty is one that stipulates for a future legislative act, 
it is one that provides specifically that such acts are contemplated. In addi-
tion to the "different principle" language in Foster and the "stipulate" lan-
guage in Percheman, a presumption of self-execution is supported by the 
fact that Foster itself remains the sole case in which the Supreme Court 
has unambiguously denied relief on the ground that the treaty was not 
self-executing.161 In the overwhelming m~ority of treaty cases, the 
Supreme Court has reached the merits without even discussing whether 
the treaty was or was not self-executing.162 
Even if Foster did contain language that supported a presumption 
against self-execution, dictum163 in a single Supreme Court decision that 
158. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 702 n.36. This is far from saying, 
however, that treaties can be enforced in the courts only if they "are specifically directed" 
to the judiciary or if the text "clearly indicates judicial enforcement." Yoo, Globalism, 
supra note 1, at 2089, 2091. The opinion says nothing even remotely resembling that. 
159. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833). 
160. Webster's New Twentieth Century Unabridged Dictionary 1790 (2d eel. 1983) 
(emphasis added) (first definition) (The second definition is "to specify as an essential 
condition of or requisite in an agreement."). On the term's denotation of specificity, see 
also, e.g., Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility 6 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1955) (1811) ("He did 
not stipulate for any particular sum, my dear Fanny; he only requested me, in general 
terms, to assist them."). 
161. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 716 & n.96. 
162. See id. at 716 n.99. 
163. This is Yoo's characterization. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2088. I have 
characterized it as an alternative holding. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 
700 n.27, 702 n.35. Professor Yoo criticizes me for "missing" the assertedly "significant" 
connection betlveen the Court's first alternative holding in Foster and its self-execution 
holding. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2088. I did not see a connection earlier, see 
Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 702 n.35, and I still do not see one. It is in the 
nature of alternative holdings that each assumes the incorrectness of the other. The 
"connection" Professor Yoo apparently sees is in fact merely a parallel: Both holdings, in 
Professor Yoo's view, reflect deference to the political branches in foreign affairs. But, 
contrary to Professor Yoo's suggestion, the Court in Foster does not suggest that the courts 
are to defer to the Executive's interpretation of treaties that are the law of the land. See 
infra p. 2202. Even if the court had articulated a rule of deference to the Executive in 
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was subsequently overruled would be a thin reed on which to rest a rule 
as incompatible with the Supremacy Clause's text as the one Professor 
Yoo advances.164 The dictum would be more than offset by the text of 
the Constitution, which, as discussed above, independently supports a 
presumption of self-execution. But, in fact, Foster (in light of Percheman) 
strongly supports a presumption of self-execution. 
4. Remaining Theories: No Treaty Is Self-Executing; No Treaty That Falls 
Within an Article I Power Is Self-Executing; The Constitution Establishes a Pre-
sumption That Treaties Are Non-Self-Executing. - The remaining theories 
parallel the first three, except they substitute the term "self-executing" for 
"law of the land."165 To the extent that ProfessorYoo understands "non-
self-executing" to mean "not domestic law," the last three theories are the 
same as the first three and must be rejected for the reasons discussed 
above. But Professor Yoo's apparent approval of the cases that equate the 
self-execution question with the private right of action question in-
treaty interpretation, it is hard to see the relevance of this to the self-execution issue. The 
Court does hold that, when a treaty promises legislation, it is addressed to the legislature. 
Beyond this, the decision tells us nothing about the allocation of powers among the 
branches. It certainly does not hold that any "types" of treaty provisions necessarily require 
implementation other than those that by their terms stipulate for legislation. See Yoo, 
Globalism, supra note 1, at 2089. 
164. Professor Yoo relies in addition on language from the Head Money Cases and 
lWiitrnry v. IWbinson that indicates, in his view, that treaties "were generally not self,. 
executing." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1970. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 
190, 194 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). But the language from 
these cases that he reads as suggesting that treaties generally are not self-executing only 
makes the obvious point that domestic courts will not get involved in international claims 
between states regarding treaty violations-i.e., claims at the international plane, rather 
than domestic cases that raise international issues. These cases do not say, as Professor Yoo 
suggests, that the courts must defer to the political branches in cases involving treaties. 
They only go so far as to recognize that the courts must respect a decision to violate a treaty 
made by particular combinations of the political branches-i.e., a majority of both Houses 
of Congress plus the President or a supermajority of both Houses without the President. 
See, e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599. As noted, had these courts embraced 
Professor Yoo's position that all treaties are non-self-executing, there would have been no 
need to articulate or rely on a last-in-time rule. Professor Yoo claims that these cases 
"linked self-execution to the specific creation of individual rights." Yoo, Globalism, supra 
note 1, at 1971. But the concept of specificity makes no appearance in any of these cases, 
but appears to have been interpolated by Professor Yoo. The cases do suggest that the 
courts' role is to enforce individual rights created by treaty. This raises but does not help 
answer the question of when a treaty creates individual rights. In the Head Money Cases, the 
Court indicated that treaties may be enforced by individuals when they prescribe a rule 
from which the rights of individuals may be determined. See 112 U.S. at 598. As I have 
noted, this appears to reflect the requirement that treaty provisions be mandatory and 
sufficiently determinate that courts can give them effect without difficulty. I discuss the 
issue more generally in Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1123-25, 1128-33. 
Suffice it to say that Professor Yoo reads far more into the dicta in these cases about self-
execution than their text will bear. 
165. Professor Yoo does not advance these last three as separate from the first three 
theories, but I discuss them separately because there are a few statements in his article that 
contradict his position that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law. 
HeinOnline  -- 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2196 1999
2196 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:2154 
troduces an ambiguity.166 If a treaty that is not self-executing is merely 
one that fails to confer a private right of action, then a categorical rule 
that all treaties (or treaties falling within Article I) are non-self-executing 
would mean that such treaties could still be invoked in court as a defense 
or pursuant to rights of action having their source in other laws, such as 
section 1983, the APA, or the common law.167 A presumption that trea-
ties are non-self-executing, on this view, would apparently allow such trea-
ties to serve as a defense or to be enforced pursuant to other laws confer-
ring rights of action, even if the presumption were not overcome. 
Overcoming the presumption would be necessary only if there were a 
need to rely on the treaty for the right of action. Moreover, overcoming 
the presumption would require unambiguous evidence that the treaty-
makers intended to create a private right of action, but not evidence that 
they intended the treaty to be effective as domestic law.168 
That this is what Professor Yoo has in mind is suggested by his discus-
sion of Ware v. Hylton, in which he finds, "contrary to internationalist 
claims," that Article IV of the treaty "did not actually give British plaintiffs 
a cause of action to sue in federal court," but, rather, "only preempted a 
defense created by state law," the "cause of action [arising] under state 
common law."169 If Professor Yoo means that, for this reason, the Court 
found the treaty to be non-self-executing, he seems to be saying that a 
non-self-executing treaty can still be relied on in court as a defense or 
pursuant to rights of action having their source outside the treaty. That 
this is his position is also suggested by his reference to the case law con-
cerning implication of private rights of action under statutes as an analo-
gous doctrine that addresses whether statutes are "self-executing."l70 Of 
course, the doctrine reflected in that line of cases is not relevant when a 
166. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1972 & n.75. 
167. In addition, the lack of a private right of action would not prevent the treaty 
from being enforced in court at the behest of the executive branch, the states or state 
officials, or even foreign states or their officials. But cf. Brief for Amicus Curiae United 
States at 11-12, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770) (arguing that 
federal district courts should not try claims of treaty violations brought by foreign 
governments seeking to overturn otherwise valid criminal proceedings in U.S. courts). Of 
course, such treaties could not be enforced in court even at the behest of these entities if 
they lacked the force of domestic law. 
168. Thus a treaty like the Warsaw Convention or the Torture Convention would be 
self-executing. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3019-20, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 
(creating right of action for certain injuries during international transportation); 
International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85 (creating right of action for damages caused by torture). 
169. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2080. 
170. ld. at 1972. 
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party relies on a statute as a defense or when he can base his right of 
action on another statute, such as section 1983.171 
On the other hand, this position is inconsistent with the position he 
takes elsewhere that non-self-executing treaties lack the effect of domestic 
law.I72 Perhaps he means to adopt the "private right of action" theory for 
purposes of determining what has to be unambiguously stated to over-
come the presumption against self-execution, but the "not effective as do-
mestic law" theory for purposes of determining the effect of a non-self-
executing treaty.I73 The result would be that a treaty that does not unam-
biguously create a private right of action would be non-self-executing, 
and as a result it could not be enforced in court even as a defense. Such a 
rule verges on the incoherent, however. Why should the failure to make 
a clear statement about the existence of a private right of action have a 
bearing on the treaty's enforceability as a defense? 
If Professor Yoo's position is simply that a treaty presumptively does 
not create a private right of action, but may still be enforced as a defense 
or pursuant to other statutes or the common law, then his theory is far 
less significant than the sweeping statements in his article suggest. In ad-
dition to being enforceable as defenses, the obligations of state and fed-
eral officials could be enforced through generic rights of action such as 
those codified in Section 1983 (for state officials), the APA (for federal 
171. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 
(1987); Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1146-47. 
172. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1961. The attempt to understand Professor 
Yoo's understanding of the concept of non-self-execution is further complicated by his 
discussion of justice Iredell's opinion in Ware v. Hylton and the subsequent negotiation of 
the Jay Treaty. Professor Yoo suggests that Iredell's opinion stood for the proposition that 
the 1783 treaty was non-self-executing. See id. at 2078. But Iredell merely interpreted the 
treaty not to apply to debts that had already been discharged by the time of the treaty's 
application. The disagreement between Iredell and the majority in Ware was thus about 
what the treaty required on the merits, not whether it was operative as law without prior 
implementation, or whether it conferred a cause of action, or about anything that might 
plausibly be regarded as a self-execution issue. Professor Yoo also suggests that john jay's 
agreement with the British to establish an international tribunal for the resolution of 
certain disputes is somehow inconsistent with the prevailing view or with the concept of 
self-execution. It is not. Indeed, a self-executing treaty could facilitate such a regime by 
requiring courts to dismiss suits that under the treaty are subject to compulsory arbitration 
or to enforce the decisions of such a tribunal. Cf. United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 
330 U.N.T.S. 3. On the other hand, regarding such a treaty as non-self-executing would 
hamper such a regime, as the treaty could not be the basis for a domestic court's decision 
to compel arbitration. 
173. That he would find a treaty to be self-executing only if it clearly states that it 
creates a private right of action is suggested by his discussion of Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 
1972-73. Elsewhere he says that a treaty that is non-self-executing does not have the force 
of domestic law. See id. at 1958-59. That he would combine the t\Vo theories in the 
manner suggested in the text is less clear, but implied by his statement that the "private 
right of action" analysis is a refinement of the intent-based analysis. ld. at 1972-73. (This 
combination of the t\Vo would conflict with his treatment of Ware, however.) 
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officials), and the habeas corpus statute (for both).174 If the legislature 
were to repeal those statutes, substantial constitutional questions would 
arise under the due process clause (and, I would argue, the Supremacy 
Clause), but that contingency is a topic for another day.175 Because of 
these statutory provisions providing rights of action against government, 
the need to find a right of action in the treaty should arise primarily 
where an individual seeks to enforce a treaty against another individual 
(or a foreign state). Here, Professor Yoo urges a rule analogous to the 
stringent one the Court has adopted for the purpose of determining 
whether a statute creates an implied right of action.176 In another article, 
I explain why the standard for implying private rights of action under 
treaties should be more lenient.177 Further discussion of this question, 
however, would take me too far afield. The very fact that the effect of 
adopting the "private right of action" interpretation would be modest is a 
strong indication that this is not what Professor Yoo has in mind. Modest 
change seems inconsistent with the article's tone and with its sweeping 
statements about the separation of powers, to which 1 shall now tum.17B 
174. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1994); 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1994); 28 u.s.c. § 2241 (1994). 
175. I discuss the issue in Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1150-51 & 
n.288. 
176. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1977. 
177. See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1157-62. 
178. ProfessorYoo's critique of my position in his Rejoinder is based on a complete 
misapprehension of my position. Yoo claims that I take the "unsparing" position that all 
treaties are self-executing and hence immediately judicially enforceable. Yoo, Treaties and 
Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2254. To the contrary, the thesis of one of my prior 
articles was that there are not one but "four grounds on which a court might legitimately 
conclude that legislative action is necessary to authorize it to enforce a treaty, 
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause." Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 696. 
See also supra Part ill.A.1 (summarizing those four distinct types of reasons that can 
support the conclusion that a treaty is non-self-executing). Yoo says that my position that 
treaties are always judicially enforceable is implausible because even the other categories of 
laws mentioned in the Supremacy Clause are not always judicially enforceable. See Yoo, 
Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2220. In fact, I have argued that the 
categories of non-self-executing treaties correspond generally to the reasons constitutional 
and statutory norms are sometimes found to be judicially unenforceable. My claim is that 
the Supremacy Clause declares the three types of norms to have the status of "Law of the 
Land," and hence the three should be judicially enforceable in at least roughly the same 
circumstances. See generally Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8. It is Yoo who seeks to 
treat treaties radically differently from the other two sorts of federal law mentioned in the 
Supremacy Clause. 
Yoo would have been closer to the mark had he contended that I take the position 
that all treaties have the force of domestic law. This position differs from the one Yoo 
attributes to me in that it recognizes that a norm may be said to have the force of domestic 
law even though it is not judicially enforceable. The position that all treaties have the force 
of domestic law derives strong support from the text of the Constitution, which provides 
that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Nevertheless, my position is not in the end that 
simple. (Unlike Professor Yoo, however, I regard the complexities I am about to describe 
as a point against my thesis. I regard simplicity in legal doctrine as desirable, and in 
particular I regard complexities that deviate from a text as problematic. Nevertheless, 1 
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IV. Yoo's STRuCTURAL .ARGUMENTS 
Professor Yoo relies as well on "deeper structural imperatives, arising 
from federalism and the separation of powers, that the Constitution im-
poses upon treaties"-imperatives that he accuses defenders of the pre-
vailing view of ignoring.l79 Presumably, he is referring here to the sweep-
ing arguments he has made throughout the article calling to mind the 
political question doctrine. Treaties should not be enforced in courts, he 
argues, because they implicate foreign policy, and the conduct of foreign 
policy is allocated by our Constitution to the political branches.18° Find-
ing a treaty to be self-executing "robs the President and Congress of the 
flexibility they might need in conducting the nation's foreigu affairs,"l81 
meaning the flexibility to violate treaty commitments. At the abstract 
level in which they most often appear in the article, these "structural im-
peratives" are too indeterminate to be of any help in answering the ques-
tions at issue. Professor Yoo's periodic attempts to derive from the cases 
more specific structural principles that support his position on the non-
self-execution of treaties, on the other hand, are wholly unpersuasive. 
I readily endorse the statement that our Constitution allocates the 
conduct of foreign policy to the political branches, but the statement is 
no more helpful at answering the tough questions than any other tautol-
ogy. Equally unassailable is the statement that enforcement of the law 
accept the complexities described below because of the need to accommodate judicial 
doctrine.) First, I recognize that treaties that go beyond the treat:ymaking power lack the 
force of domestic law. Second, and more controversially, I accept that the _treat:ymakers 
have the power to enter into an international treaty obligation towards individuals but 
deny it the force of domestic law by attaching to it a "no-domestic-effect" reservation. 
Unlike Yoo, I do not regard the question of the validity of such reservations to be easy, but 
I ultimately accept the practice's constitutionality because I cannot find a stable and 
principled distinction between such reservations and what the Court upheld in Foster. Yoo 
criticizes me for abandoning the purity of my literal interpretation of the Supremacy 
Clause by reducing the clause to a mere presumption, but this criticism is ironic because: 
(a) Yoo had earlier criticized my literal interpretation as simplistic, and (b) Yoo makes 
exactly the same move when he discovers that what he regards as the correct interpretation 
of the Constitution is untenable in light of entrenched judicial doctrine. 
Even though much of my prior writing on this subject has sought to reconcile the 
categories of non-self-executing treaties with the status of such treaties as domestic law by 
pointing to circumstances in which the other forms of domestic law have been found to be 
judicially unenforceable, I do not "take [Yoo] to task for equating whether a treaty is a law 
of the land, and therefore domestic law, with whether a treaty is enforceable in court. "Yoo, 
Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 n.l19. In fact, I am quite 
sympathetic to the claim that the status of a norm as domestic law entails the norm's 
enforceability in court against those on whom it imposes a duty, by those for whose benefit 
it imposes the duty is not a legal norm. My effort has been to show that treaties have 
generally been held non-self-executing for reasons that are either consistent with this 
principle or fall within narrow exceptions to it. I thus largely agree with his statements in 
"Globalism" that, under his theory, non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic 
law. This is indeed the basis of my textual critique of his position. 
179. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1982. 
180. See id. at 1979. 
181. Id. 
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has been allocated to the legal branches (including the courts). The 
Constitution may be said to require that foreign policy be conducted 
within the bounds established by the law. In other words, when a matter 
is governed by law, it is outside the realm of mere "policy," whether for-
eign or domestic. Thus, the political branches may not infringe constitu-
tional rights even when doing so would advance foreign policy goals.182 
Similarly, foreign policy must be conducted in accordance with statutes 
that regulate foreign commerce.xss Like the Constitution and federal 
statutes, treaties are declared by the Supremacy Clause to be law. Thus, 
the Constitution may well require that those responsible for conducting 
foreign policy do so in accordance with applicable treaties. The truism 
that our Constitution allocates the conduct of foreign policy to the polit-
ical branches does not help us answer that question. 
Moreover, the doctrine of self-executing treaties "robs" the political 
branches of their flexibility only if we independently establish that the 
Constitution entitles those branches to more flexibility than the doctrine 
gives them. Even without a presumption against self-execution, the polit-
ical branches retain a great deal of flexibility to violate treaties. A mcyor-
ity of both Houses plus the President may do so by passing a statute that 
conflicts with the treaty.IS4 The President and the Senate may do so by 
concluding a later inconsistent treaty with another nation. Iss They may 
do so without the agreement of another nation by abrogating the 
treaty.IS6 More controversially, they may even attach a reservation mak-
ing it clear that the treaty is not judicially enforceable.IS7 In certain cir-
cumstances, at least, the President acting alone may abrogate a treaty. 188 
Even when the President lacks the power to abrogate a treaty alone, the 
courts apparently will not interfere with his "flexibility" to do so.189 The 
conclusion that a treaty is self-executing admittedly precludes lower-level 
182. See, e.g., Boos v. Bany, 485 U.S. 312, 323-24 (1988) (holding D.C. code in 
violation of the First Amendment despite its enactment for reasons of foreign policy). 
183. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that presidential power is at its weakest in areas where 
Congress has affirmatively acted). 
184. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that when a statute 
conflicts with a provision of a treaty, the latter in time will prevail); Head Money Cases, 112 
U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (same). 
185. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 443-45 (1975) (holding 
that treaty concluded in 1889 terminated 1867 treaty between Indian tribe and the United 
States). 
186. See VanDer Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co., 297 U.S. 114, 116-18 (1936) (holding 
that United States' termination of a treaty provision prevents the provision from being 
relied on in U.S. courts). 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 136-140. 
188. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that when engaged in the recognition or derecognition of a country, the President 
may, as an incident of executive power, abrogate a treaty). 
189. See id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that whether a 
treaty has been properly terminated is a political question). But cf. id. at 998 (Powell,J., 
concurring) (stating that question may be justiciable in certain circumstances). 
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executive officials, and perhaps the President as well, from violating a 
treaty that has not been validly (or perhaps even invalidly) terminated. 
Such officials may wish to have the flexibility to violate treaties that have 
not been terminated or declared non-self-executing, but Professor Yoo 
has not shown why our Constitution is best interpreted to provide such 
flexibility. Flexibility has its benefits, but so does precommitment. The 
decision to have a constitution that limits as well as grants powers and 
which, among other things, gives treaties the status oflaw, reflects a rejec-
tion of unlimited flexibility in favor of precommitment. 
Furthermore, the proposed presumption against self-execution may 
actually hobble the political branches in their conduct of foreign policy. 
Recall that a non-self-executing treaty is not judicially enforceable even 
against the states. If Professor Yoo's presumption were adopted, a treaty 
would be enforceable in court against the states, even at the behest of the 
federal government, only if the treatymakers made it clear that they in-
tended it to be. The political branches may not welcome the burden Pro-
fessor Yoo would place on them or the consequences of failing to over-
come the presumption. The presumption Professor Yoo advocates would 
give the states a greater opportunity to block an attempt to give the treaty 
domestic legal force, quite possibly to the ultimate detriment of our for-
eign policy. This result may be defensible on federalism grounds, but 
Professor Yoo has not rested his argument on federalism principles.190 
Professor Yoo is no more successful at deriving more specific and 
determinate separation-o£.powers principles from the cases. For exam-
ple, he cites Foster for the principle that the judiciary's role is limited to 
"'decid[ing] upon individual rights, according to those principles which 
the political departments of the nation have established.'"191 But this 
does not tell us, as Professor Yoo suggests, that the courts have "no special 
role" in the enforcement of treaties.l92 On the contrary, the "'principles 
which the political departments of the nation have established'" would 
190. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2091-94. Professor Yoo's exclusive focus on 
horizontal separation of powers suggests that he might permit even non-self-executing 
treaties to be enforced in court against states, at least at the behest of the federal 
government. But this would be inconsistent with his recognition that non-self-executing 
treaties lack domestic legal force. State law cannot be preempted by federal norms lacking 
the force of law. Perhaps he would construe a non-self-executing treaty as a delegation of 
lawmaking power to the Executive Branch. This would solve some of the problems just 
noted, as it would allow the Executive Branch to issue a regulation implementing the 
treaty. Inconsistent state laws would be preempted by the regulation, and their 
enforcement could be enjoined by a court at the behest of the federal government. There 
is little doubt that a treaty could delegate lawmaking power to the Executive in this way, 
but Professor Yoo has not explained the basis for construing treaties to delegate lawmaking 
power to the Executive even when they are silent on the issue. Indeed, it is not clear that 
Professor Yoo would approve of such a presumption, as it would not offer what he sees as 
the principal benefit of the presumption he advocates-the preservation of a role for the 
most representative of the branches, the House. 
191. ld. at 2088 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829)). 
192. ld. at 1965. 
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appear to include treaties made by the President and the Senate.193 Pro-
fessor Yoo has given us no reason to conclude otherwise. Professor Yoo 
also appears to interpret the statement that the courts are to get involved 
only where the treaty involves "individual rights" as somehow "ensur[ing] 
that the political branches ... retain the power to choose how or whether 
to implement the nation's international obligations."194 He draws a false 
dichotomy. If a treaty creates individual rights, the courts have a role in 
enforcing them. This does not negate the power of the political branches 
to break the treaty by passing a statute or abrogating the treaty, but the 
existence of this power does not imply that the enforcement of a treaty 
that has not been terminated or superseded is entirely in the hands of the 
political branches. 
The principle for which Professor Yoo cites Foster does help explain 
why the courts were required to defer to the President's interpretation of 
the treaty at issue in that part of the opinion, an 1803 treaty between 
Spain and France (thus not one made by the political departments of the 
United States). But, for the same reason, the fact that the Court found it 
appropriate to defer to the Executive's interpretation of such a treaty tells 
us little about the need for judicial deference to the Executive with re-
spect to treaties that are the law of the land.195 
Similarly, Professor Yoo cites the Head Money Cases and Whitney v. 
Robinson for the general proposition that "the political branches are to 
enforce treaties, break treaties, or to seek remedies for their violation," 
but "the courts generally are to restrain themselves from entering the 
area" oftreatyviolations.196 But the broad language from those opinions 
that Professor Yoo relies on establishes only that the courts have no role 
to play in resolving disputes between nations at the international plane. 
When it comes to resolving disputes about alleged treaty violations at the 
domestic plane, the Court merely holds that the courts must defer to a 
decision to break a treaty made by specific combinations of the political 
branches: a mcyority of both Houses plus the President, or a 
supermajority of both Houses without the President. The Court, in other 
words, merely applied the last-in-time rule. That the political branches 
may bind the courts by passing a statute does not mean that they can do 
so without passing a statute. Professor Yoo has read far greater limita-
193. Id. at 2088 (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. at 307). 
194. Id. at 2089. 
195. If the courts were required to defer to the Executive's interpretation of U.S. 
treaties, those who were litigating against the Executive in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council 
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (refugee challenge to Executive's interpretation of treaty), 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (challenge by criminal defendant of 
Executive's interpretation of extradition treaty), and in many other cases, could have been 
quickly dispatched. Instead, their arguments were considered on their merits without any 
mention of deference. 
196. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1970. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 
195 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591-600 (1884). 
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tions on the courts into these and other cases than their language will 
bear.197 
CONCLUSION: ON UNSE'ITLING THE SETILED 
As Professor Flaherty notes at the start of his Response, Professor Yoo 
is now among the ranks of a small group of scholars who have embarked 
on the project of unsettling what had previously been thought to be set-
ded in the area of foreign affairs law. This entire project is in my view 
vulnerable to a powerful threshold objection: It undermines one of the 
central reasons for having law-its setdement function. The dictum that 
it is often more important that something be setded than that it be setded 
right198 is as applicable to constitutional law as to other forms oflaw.199 
The setdement function is reflected most prominendy in the doctrine of 
stare decisis, and even the greatest judicial defenders of the importance 
of text and original intent in constitutional adjudication admit that they 
do not always prevail over judicial precedent. 20o 
The fact that a point of law is setded is thus by itself a reason not to 
unsetde it. This does not mean, of course, that there can be no sound 
reasons for unsetding the setded. Clearly there were sound reasons for 
197. Another example of overread.ing is Professor Yoo's interpretation of Argentine 
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). He cites that case as 
establishing the proposition that the Supreme Court has now adopted the "private right of 
action" view of the non-self-execution doctrine. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1972-73. 
Amerada Hess involved the question whether, by becoming a party to certain treaties, 
Argentina had waived its sovereign immunity. The treaties said nothing about sovereign 
immunity. The Court held that the treaties did not withdraw Argentina's immunity 
because they "only set forth substantive rules of conduct and state that compensation shall 
be paid for certain wrongs. They do not create private rights of action for foreign 
corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in United States courts." 
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442 (footnote omitted). This statement has no implications for 
the self-execution issue. It merely recognizes that a treaty that does not address the 
amenability to suit of a foreign state in U.S. courts does not remove such a state's 
immunity. For the proposition that the Court now equates the self-execution issue with the 
private right of action issue, Professor Yoo relies on the Court's "telling" citation of Fosterv. 
Neilson and the Head Money Cases after the statement quoted above. Why the Court cited 
these cases for the proposition is admittedly mysterious. But to draw the conclusions from 
it that Professor Yoo draws is a stretch, to say the least. Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist or 
his clerk meant what Professor Yoo says when they inserted the "cf." cite to Foster and the 
Head Money Cases, but it seems unreasonable to attribute such a position to the Court as a 
whole. 
198. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
199. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1371 & n.48 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The 
Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1997). 
200. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, William Howard Taft 
Constitntional Law Lecture at the U. ofCin. (Sept. 16, 1988), in 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 861 
(1989) ("[A]Imost every originalist would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of 
stare decisis • • • • ") • 
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unsettling what was settled by Scott v. Sandford'2°1 or Plessy v. Ferguson.2°2 
But those who propose to unsettle the settled bear a high threshold bur-
den of persuasion-and the strongest reasons for jettisoning a settled 
rule would appear to be those based on morality and justice. 2°3 Professor 
Yoo invokes democracy, but the very decision to have a constitution that 
places limits on m~orities is inconsistent with a pure form of democracy, 
and the most desirable impure form of democracy is the subject of too 
much disagreement to justify the rejection of a consensus on a point such 
as the one under discussion here. At any rate, ProfessorYoo has not of-
fered any robust theory of democracy, let alone one that warrants the 
rejection of the prevailing view. 
Professors Curtis A Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have devoted con-
siderable effort to attempt to unsettle the principle that, under our Con-
stitution, customary international law is federallaw.2°4 They note with 
some force that the consensus on this issue appears to have been pro-
duced by anachronistically reading pre-Erie claims that customary interna-
tional law is part of our law to mean that customary international law is 
federal law in a post-Erie sense. But the fact that a settled point began in 
error is not a reason to reject it. The same sort of criticism could be 
leveled at the decisions that originally adopted the last-in-time rule, 205 yet 
we do not see many calls for its rejection, 2°6 least of all from these schol-
ars. Indeed, the very point of the doctrine of stare decisis is to require 
courts to follow precedents without inquiring into their correctness. The 
201. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
202. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
203. If, as discussed earlier, entrenched precedent prevails over arguments based on 
text and history, it can be overcome only by bringing strong arguments based on justice 
and morality into the mix. 
204. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997). 
205. See Whitneyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888); Taylorv. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 
784, 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799). These decisions reasoned that treaties and 
statutes have equivalent status because the Supremacy Clause makes no distinction 
between them. However, the Supremacy Clause similarly makes no distinction between 
the Constitution and those two other forms of federal law, yet we have no difficulty saying 
that the Constitution controls the other two. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 853, 867 & n.67, 869 & n.72 (1987). 
206. But see Henkin, supra note 205, at 886 (arguing that "the power to derogate" 
from international law should be "strictly limited"); Louis Henkin, Treaties in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 10 Micb.J. Int'l L. 406, 425-26 (1989) (arguing that the last-in-
time rule reflects a misunderstanding of Article VI); Jules Lobel, The Limits of 
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 Va. L. 
Rev. 1071, 1110 (1985) (arguing that the historical basis for the last-in-time rule suggests its 
limitation). I have made it clear that I accept the last-in-time rule because it is entrenched. 
See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 696 n.9; Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra 
note 8, at 1114 n.126. 
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doctrine has bite only when it causes a court to follow a precedent that it 
regards as wrong. 207 
Perhaps Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Yoo would defend their 
project on the ground that their whole point is that these areas are not 
properly governed by law at all. The fact that unsettling it undermines 
the point of law is not an objection if their point is that law properly has 
no role to play here. That this is Professor Yoo's position is suggested by 
his description of a scenario of which he apparently approves: 
Rather than imposing a fixed rule of self-execution, the Consti-
tution may allow the House and Senate to use their constitu-
tional and political powers over legislation and funding to pre-
vent direct treaty implementation. Congress may use its powers 
in specific cases to establish the broad principle that any treaty 
that infringes upon the scope of the domestic legislative power 
must be implemented by legislation, or it can use its powers on a 
case-by-case basis to ensure that it plays a central role in treaty 
implementation. After this process of cooperation or struggle, 
the branches may even arrive at a rule of complete non-self-exe-
cution, depending on historical and international circum-
stances, the relative power of the branches, and the people's 
wishes.208 
The picture Professor Yoo paints here of a process of struggle among 
the branches and a possible resolution based on "relative power" is, of 
course, the very opposite of the rule of law. Although Professor Yoo 
clearly welcomes such a process of struggle, he tells us little about why it 
would be a good thing. The Founders experienced considerable struggle 
during the critical period attempting to get the states to comply with 
treaty obligations, but they did not look back on that experience with 
equanimity. They regarded it as a problem, and they addressed it by de-
claring treaties to be supreme law. And-unlike the Continental Congress, 
which passed a resolution declaring treaties to be the law of the land 
(something that Professor Yoo appears to envision as one of the possible 
outcomes of this struggle)-the Founders enshrined this declaration in a 
constitution, which they in turn also declared to be supreme law. This was 
quite obviously an attempt to settle the issue by (partially) removing 
treaty compliance from the realm of politics. 
Of course, enshrining a decision in the Constitution cannot by itself 
settle the point. For any attempted settlement to succeed, it has to be 
accepted by those exercising power, which means ultimately by the peo-
ple. The success of the settlement attempted by our Framers required 
207. Moreover, even if the principle that customary international law is federal law 
did originate in error, it has since been ratified for more persuasive reasons. See Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (relying on Phillip C. Jessup, The 
Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Thompkins Applied to International Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 
740, 743 (1939) (urging Supreme Court not to apply Erie doctrine to international law in 
federal courts)). 
208. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2093. 
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the ratification of the instrument by state conventions, but also, and per-
haps as importantly, the acceptance by the people of such vital aspects of 
the settlement as the institution of judicial review (vital because it in tum 
facilitated further settlements). This just goes to show that, if anything, 
the general acceptance of a principle is more important to its status as law 
than the enshrinement of that principle in a text. The principle that trea-
ties in the United States have the force of domestic law is both enshrined 
in text and, until now at least, has been generally accepted. 
Precisely because the principle is enshrined in the Constitution, the 
proposition that treaties have the status of federal law stands on consider-
ably firmer ground than the claim that customary international law is fed-
erallaw. Indeed, for this reason, I had regarded the proposition as im-
mune from attack. On this point, I am happy to have been proved 
wrong. Professor Yoo has performed a valuable service by initiating this 
exchange. It is healthy for a theory, no matter how ·widely adhered to, to 
be challenged from time to time.2°9 In law, unlike other disciplines, the 
fact that an interpretation is widely accepted itself counts as a reason to 
retain it. But, since it is not a conclusive reason, it is useful to be re-
minded that an interpretation has more going for it than that. Professor 
Yoo's article and the responses it has generated have helped to show that 
sometimes a point of law is not just settled, but settled right. 
CODA 
In his Rejoinder, ProfessorYoo attempts to supply persuasive textual, 
structural, and doctrinal arguments in defense of his position that our 
Constitution did not reject but "continue[d] the British system" concern-
ing the status of treaties as domestic law.21° He aptly captures the rule he 
claims our Constitution establishes in an epigram from Frederick 
Maitland: "Suppose the queen contracts ·with France that English iron or 
coal shall not be exported to France-until a statute has been passed 
forbidding exportation, one may export and laugh at the treaty. "211 Pro-
fessor Yoo's claim that this is the rule established by our Constitution, 
which declares treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land," is untenable 
from a textual, structural, and doctrinal perspective. 
Preliminarily, I note that Yoo is not altogether successful in clarifying 
exactly what his position is. He describes a hard position, which he ap-
pears to regard as the correct interpretation of the Constitution from a 
textual and structural perspective. But, recognizing that the hard posi-
209. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 97, 108 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin 
Books 1985) (1859) ("[H]owever true [an opinion] may be, if it is not fully, frequently, 
and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth .... [Even if] the 
received opinion [is] true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear 
apprehension and deep feeling of its truth."). 
210. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2230. 
211. Id. at 2227 (quoting Frederick W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of 
England 425 (1908)). 
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tion is untenable from a doctrinal perspective, he offers in the alternative 
a softer position. The hard position is that treaties that address matters 
falling within the scope of Article I are non-self-executing and thus re-
quire legislative implementation, even if they purport to be self-execut-
ing, while treaties that address matters falling outside Article I are self-
executing.2I2 The softer position is that treaties regulating matters within 
the scope of Article I are non-self-executing unless the treatymakers 
clearly stated that the treaty is self-executing (i.e., a presumption of non-
self-execution).213 There is an ambiguity, however, concerning whatYoo 
thinks legislation is needed for. In describing the hard and soft rules, 
Yoo states that the treaties would not be enforceable in courts without 
such legislation.214 But in the portion of the Rejoinder responding to 
Professor Flaherty, Yoo dismisses some of the statements Flaherty relies 
on as irrelevant because they merely "show that treaties were understood 
to be supreme over contrary state law."215 "'Globalism' does not dispute 
this conclusion, but addresses the different question of the relationship 
between treaties and the federal legislative power."216 
The two questions, however, are not in fact different. The self-execu-
tion question is a mixed question of federalism and separation of powers: 
A self-executing treaty is a treaty that preempts inconsistent state law with-
out the need for action by the federal legislature, and a non-self-execut-
ing treaty is one that does not preempt state law without such action. In 
stating that "Globalism" does not dispute that treaties preempt inconsis-
tent state laws, Yoo suggests that, under his hard rule, a treaty falling 
within the scope of Article I does preempt inconsistent state law but does 
not prevail over prior federal law. This, however, would be less a thesis 
about self-execution than about the hierarchy of the forms of federal law, 
an issue addressed by the last-in-time rule, under which treaties and stat-
utes are understood to have equivalent stature and hence the last in time 
prevails. Yoo's Rejoinder takes on the last-in-time rule in a footnote,2I 7 
but if this was his principal target, I'm afraid I completely misappre-
hended the point of "Globalism." On the assumption that he means to 
advance a thesis about self-execution, I shall address the hard and soft 
rules as he sometimes describes them: A treaty within the scope of Article 
I is, either categorically or presumptively, unenforceable in courts unless 
212. See id. at 2220. 
213. See id. 
214. See id. at 2248. 
215. Id. at 2224. 
216. Id. 
217. See id. at 2243 n.93. 
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implemented by statute. 218 I note, however, that this deprives his critique 
of Professor Flaherty's Response of what little force it had. 219 
In addressing Yoo's defense of these positions, I shall begin with his 
hard position, as that is what he appears to regard as the correct interpre-
tation of the Constitution from a textual and structural perspective. He 
retreats to his soft position only because he recognizes that his hard posi-
tion is untenable in light of judicial doctrine. I shall address his soft posi-
tion, therefore, only in connection with his doctrinal arguments. I also 
note thatYoo appears to buttress some ofhis textual and structural argu-
ments by reference to the ratification debates he discussed in "Global-
ism." His extensive discussion of those debates, however, led him to con-
clude only that the original understanding did not conclusively or 
definitively establish the correctness of the prevailing view, and thus re-
quired a shifting of the debate to textual, structural, and doctrinal argu-
ments. If the originalist evidence, taken as a whole, is inconclusive, then 
Yoo cannot in good faith smuggle originalist arguments into the textual, 
structural, and doctrinal debate. 
In response to my textual critique of his thesis, Professor Yoo dis-
putes my claim that "law," as that term is used in the Supremacy Clause, 
entails presumptive judicial enforceability. This is not the place to de-
fend further the conceptual link between law and courts.22o Suffice it to 
say that Yoo does not develop an alternative understanding of "law" 
under which the treaties that he would regard as non-self-executing 
would be law. He tentatively advances a view of "law" that resembles the 
one I attributed to Professor Henkin above: Even if a norm is not judi-
cially enforceable, it is law as long as it is "binding" on those addressed by 
the norm.221 Yoo states that "[a] constitutional, statutory, or treaty provi-
218. This interpretation is supported by id. at 2239 (criticizing me for claiming that 
all treaties "automatically preempt inconsistent state law"); id. at 2254 (recognizing that a 
treaty that falls within the "exclusive powers of the states" (and apparently only such a 
treaty) can be enforced by the judiciary "against inconsistent state law."). 
219. Under the approach to self-execution elaborated in "Four Doctrines," treaties 
falling into the "private right of action" category of non-self-executing treaties would 
preempt inconsistent state laws, see Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719-22, 
while treaties in the other three categories would not. As noted above, supra Part III.B.4, 
although portions of"Globalism" appeared to embrace the "private right of action" version 
of non-self-execution, most of "Globalism" seemed to take the position that non-self-
executing treaties lack domestic legal force (and thus would not preempt inconsistent state 
laws). The Rejoinder appears to resolve the conflict by embracing the latter view; it does 
not appear to take the position that a non-self-executing treaty is one that does not create a 
private right of action but is otherwise enforceable in court. Cf. Yoo, Treaties and Public 
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2244 (analogizing his proposed rule to "[t]he Court's strict 
test on private rights of action" to the extent the latter test "means that numerous federal 
statutory provisions cannot be enforced in court"). My discussion in the text thus refers to 
treaties that are non-self-executing in the other three senses. See also supra note 86. 
220. I offer an extended defense in Vazquez, Constitution as Law of the Land, supra 
note 88. 
221. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 n.119. See supra text 
accompanying note 125. 
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sion can achieve 'law of the land' status through presidential or congres-
sional, rather than judicial, action,"222 and hence "[o]ne might read the 
'Law of the Land' phrase as an affirmative duty of the federal govern-
ment, as a whole, to give effect to constitutional, statutory, or treaty 
obligations. "223 
But this position is inconsistent with the position he took in "Global-
ism,"224 and repeats in the Rejoinder, that, under his view, "the executive 
and legislative branches would remain free to break the treaty. "225 How can 
the executive and legislative branches be legally free to break a treaty if 
the treaty is legally "binding" and the federal government has the "affirm-
ative duty" to give it effect? That Professor Yoo does not in fact believe 
that a non-self-executing treaty has the force of domestic law is shown by 
his descriptions of the British rule, which he claims our Constitution 
"continue[s],"226 most notably his quotation from Maitland that one may 
"laugh at" treaties until they are implemented by statute. 227 Although he 
is more careful in the Rejoinder to avoid saying that non-self-executing 
treaties lack the force of internal law, even here this view occasionally 
surfaces.228 Finally, the logic of his textual argument seems to require 
the conclusion that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic 
law. As discussed below, his textual argument rests on the idea that to 
recognize a treaty as self-executing would be to give it the force oflegisla-
tion and thus to intrude on Article I's grant of exclusive legislative power 
to Congress. If the problem is solved by regarding treaties falling within 
the Article I legislative power as non-self-executing, it is only because to 
do so is to deny such treaties the status of law. 229 
Yoo also disputes my argument that "Law of the Land" status entails 
presumptive judicial enforceability by pointing to the "judges" portion of 
the Supremacy Clause. 230 He argnes that, if "Law of the Land" status 
222. Yoo, Treades and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249. In fact, no such 
acdon is necessary, as the Consdtudon itself grants those three types of norms "'law of the 
land' status." I shall read Professor Yoo's statement as expressing the view that a norm can 
have the status of law of the land even if its enforcement has been allocated to branches 
other than the judiciary. 
223. Id. 
224. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979 (non-self-execudon gives polidcal branches 
the discretion to determine how or whether to comply with treaty obligations). 
225. Yoo, Treades and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 (emphasis added). 
226. Id. at 2229-30. 
227. See supra text accompanying note 21!. 
228. See, e.g., Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2223 (arguing 
that the Consdtudon was designed to give the House the power to "block a treaty's 
domesdc effect" "by withholding implementation"). 
229. That he does not regard a non-self-execudng treaty as having the force of 
domestic law is suggested as well by his apparent recognition that his posidon would be 
wholly implausible if he were contending that all treaties are non-self-execudng. See infra 
text accompanying note 244. 
230. This is sometimes referred to as the judges Clause," see Evan H. Caminker, 
Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199, 207. 
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implied judicial enforceability, it would have been redundant to go on to 
direct state judges to give effect to the Constitution, federal statutes and 
treaties notwithstanding inconsistent state laws. This argument cannot 
get Yoo anywhere. If the latter portion is superfluous, then both portions 
support my position; if it is not superfluous, then the latter portion sup-
ports it instead of the former. I assume that Yoo is not making the unten-
able argument that state judges are required to enforce treaties but fed-
eral judges are not. If so, he would have to contend with the unanimity of 
opinion since the Founding that federal and not just state judges are 
bound by federal statutes and the Constitution, to say nothing of treaties. 
Most likely, the clause mentions state judges and not federal judges be-
cause the former and not the latter were thought to need a specific in-
struction to disregard inconsistent state law. If anything, the reference to 
state judges reinforces the link between law and courts that is the basis of 
the presumption I defend. 
In disputing my claim that the Supremacy Clause is self-executing 
with respect to treaties, Yoo relies as well on the fact that Article III is not 
self-executing with respect to the lower federal courts.231 I fail to see how 
this fact supports his argument. It is true that the Founders opted to 
leave the decision whether to create lower federal courts to the legisla-
ture. The default regime for judicially enforcing the supreme Law of the 
Land was through litigation in the state courts, with an appeal to the 
Supreme Court. This is how treaty cases reached the Supreme Court for 
much of our history. The only relevance of this regime, known as the 
Madisonian Compromise, to the issue under discussion here is that it 
shows that the Founders knew how to write a non-self-executing constitu-
tional provision when they wanted to. Article III makes it clear that the 
lower federal courts shall exist only if Congress creates them; Article VI, 
by contrast, simply declares treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land." 
Yoo fares no better in presenting affirmative defenses of his own po-
sition. The textual support Yoo musters for his hard position is exceed-
ingly weak. His claim, as noted, is that giving a treaty self-executing effect 
is to treat the treaty as legislation, yet the Constitution's placement of the 
treatymaking power within Article II shows that treatymaking was re-
garded as an executive power. Giving self-executing effect to such execu-
tive action would violate Article I's vesting of the legislative power exclu-
sively in Congress. Even if we credited each of those textual points, Yoo 
would have established at best a conflict among constitutional texts. It is 
indisputable, after all, that Article II allocates the treatymaking power to 
the President, with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and that Arti-
cle VI gives treaties the status of "law of the land, and therefore domestic 
law."232 Thus, if we equate "legislation" and "law," as Yoo does, then the 
combination of Articles II and VI would produce a clear allocation of 
231. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2246. 
232. Id. at 2249 n.119. 
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legislative power to the President (and Senate). If this conflicts with Arti-
cle I, the solution would appear to be to give effect to the more specific 
provisions, which in this case would be the ones specifically addressing 
treaties. In fact, though, there is no necessary conflict, as the text of Arti-
cle I allocates to the Congress only the legislative powers "herein 
granted." The constitutional text can thus easily be read to provide that 
only the legislative powers granted in Article I are vested in Congress, 
leaving open the possibility that legislative powers granted in other arti-
cles might rest elsewhere. 233 
Moreover, Yoo's textual argument fails to explain why a treaty that 
regulates matters falling outside the legislative power as enumerated in 
Article I can be self-executing. If the problem is that giving treaties do-
mestic effect violates the textual grant of the legislative power to Con-
gress, then the problem would seem to extend to any Article II treaty. 
Yoo defends this aspect of his rule by noting that a treaty that regu-
lates matters outside Article I does not impinge Congress's prerogatives, 
as by hypothesis Congress lacks any power in the matter. This is not a 
textual argument but a structural one.234 From a structural perspective, 
however, Yoo's position seems, if possible, even more problematic. It is 
true that Congress cannot complain if the treatymakers are granted the 
power to legislate on matters beyond the scope of its legislative powers, 
but, as Yoo recognizes, the legislative power was limited not to protect 
Congress but to protect the states and the people.235 Although Yoo criti-
cizes my position because it would permit an easy circumvention of feder-
alism limits,236 he overlooks the fact that his proposal would permit the 
very same thing. National power would remain precisely as broad under 
his theory, as the Congress would retain the power to implement treaties 
that fall within Article I and the treatymakers would retain the power to 
"legislate" on matters falling beyond the scope of Article I. 
The national power would be structured differendy under his theory, 
as it would take the consent of the House to implement a treaty falling 
233. Although I am here engaging in a purely textual argument, I am unaware of any 
evidence that the Framers intended something different by the phrase "herein granted." 
To the contrary, the fact that the proposal to add the phrase to Article I was made by 
Gouverneur Morris, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale LJ. 
1725, 1789-91 (1996), the same man who had earlier stressed that "treaties were to be 
'laws,'" 2 Farrand, Records, supra note 20, at 390, indicates that he regarded treatymaking 
as a quasi-legislative power allocated to the President and Senate. 
234. Yoo also seeks to derive support from the ratification debates he discusses. See, 
e.g., Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2222 n.17. But, for the reasons 
noted above, reliance on such evidence is inconsistent with Yoo's own conclusion that, 
taken as a whole, the debates are inconclusive. See supra text accompanying notes 
219-220. 
235. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2234. 
236. See id. at 2237 ("In making treaties self-executing, Vazquez and other 
internationalists would create a potentially limitless legislative power."); id. at 2238 ("Self-
execution also would free the treatymakers from federalism limitations, which 
internationalists claim do not apply to treaties."). 
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within the scope of Article I. Yoo defends this result as more consistent 
with the constitutional structure because it subjects international agree-
ments to the difficult procedures the Founders deliberately required 
before state law could be preempted by federal law, and he argues that it 
protects the principle of popular sovereignty because it requires the par-
ticipation of the most representative part of the legislature. 237 He hy-
pothesizes horrible changes that the treatymakers might effectuate if 
freed of these structural safeguards, such as changes in the separation of 
powers system as we know it. 238 My own view is that the treatymaking 
power is subject to a structural safeguard that is at least as effective as 
those to which the legislative power is subject: the requirement of the 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate. 239 It is inconceivable to me that two-
thirds of the Senate would agree to the sorts of horribles Yoo parades. 
Even Yoo recognizes that it is "perhaps unlikely" that a treaty would gain 
the support of two-thirds of the Senate without having the support of a 
m<9ority of the House.240 Indeed, the practice of giving domestic legal 
force to international agreements through ordinary legislation has arisen 
precisely because of the difficulty of getting two-thirds of the Senate to 
agree on anything.241 
If I did think that the treatymaking process lacked adequate safe-
guards against unwise or unpopular laws, I would not find Yoo's solution 
very appealing. Yoo would allow the hypothetically unwise or unpopular 
treaties to take direct effect precisely in those categories of cases that, 
according to Article I, are least deserving of federal attention. I would 
take some comfort from the fact that the federal legislative power today is 
quite broad; the smaller the sphere reserved to the states by Article I, the 
smaller the sphere in which treaties could be self-executing. But, as the 
Supreme Court frequently notes, as originally understood, "[t]he powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government" were 
thought to be "few and defined," while those reserved to the states were 
237. See id. at 2240. 
238. See id. at 2237. 
239. See Vazquez, Treaty Power, supra note 146, at 1339. 
240. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2240 n.79. 
241. Cf. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. 
Rev. 799, 801, 837-42 (1995) (linking rise of congressional-executive agreements to 
difficulty of obtaining Senate consent for Versailles treaty). If anything, the more 
significant popular sovereignty objection to the treatymaking power is that it makes it too 
hard to make treaties, not too easy. One-third of the Senate, representing a minuscule 
portion of the national electorate, can block a treaty having broad popular support. A 
version of this objection infects the ordinary legislative process. Indeed, it is more likely, 
given the make-up of the Senate, that a piece of ordinary legislation will fail to pass even 
though it is supported by a majority of the national electorate than that a treaty will be 
approved even though it is not supported by a majority of the electorate. Indeed, the 
composition of the Senate shows clearly that the Founders did not ultimately embrace the 
pure form of popular sovereignty on which Yoo's arguments are grounded. Those 
arguments would perhaps support a constitutional amendment rejecting the Great 
Compromise, but they are not a basis for interpreting the Constitution we now have. 
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thought to be "numerous and indefinite."242 If we agreed with Yoo that 
the treatymaking process lacks adequate safeguards, it is implausible to 
read the Constitution as approving this "constitutionally dangerous"243 
process for what was considered the broad and indefinite area othenvise 
resexved to the states, and as correcting the problem only for the narrow 
area delegated to Congress under Article I. 
If we assumed the area resexved to the states by Article I to be nar-
row, on the other hand, Yoo would face a different problem. Yoo recog-
nizes in the end that his position would be untenable from a textual 
standpoint if he would deny self-executing effect to all treaties, 244 but he 
maintains that he is not vulnerable to this objection because he accepts 
that treaties can be self-executing if they regulate matters outside Article 
I.245 Given the Supremacy Clause's reference to "all Treaties," however, 
this textual defense is unconvincing if only a small subset of treaties in 
fact are self-executing and hence the law of the land. 
Professor Yoo's proposal appears to be an attempt to find a clever 
·way out of a tight box." But there is no discernable textual or structural 
reason for a rule in which a treaty that falls within the Article I legislative 
power lacks domestic legal effect while a treaty falling outside that power 
has such effect. The sole purpose of such a rule appears to be to presexve 
some category of treaty for the Supremacy Clause to operate on. But Yoo 
at best escapes from a tight textual box only to find himself in an even 
tighter structural box. A broad view of the federal legislative power would 
mean that the text's reference to "all Treaties" implausibly refers only to a 
small subset of treaties. A narrow view of federal power under Article I, 
on the other hand, would mean that Congress implausibly decided to 
make a constitutionally dangerous structure applicable to a broad range 
of situations, correcting the problem only for a narrow subset. The ·way 
out of this Catch-22 is of course to reject Yoo's claim that the treatymak-
ing power is dangerously lacking safeguards against un'vise or unpopular 
laws. But this leaves his structural argument without its linchpin.246 
Yoo fares no better with doctrinal arguments. He argues that Ware v. 
Hyfton247 is consistent with his hard rule because the treaty involved in 
the case addressed matters outside the scope of Article I.248 It is difficult 
242. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45 
(James Madison)). 
243. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2256. 
244. See id. at 2254. 
245. See id. 
246. I note that Yoo finds Professor Bradley's argument that the treatymaking power 
is limited by Article I to be "powerful." Id. at 2239 n.76. Since Yoo himself ultimately 
concedes that his rule is tenable only to the extent it would recognize at least a small sliver 
of treaties as self-executing, Yoo's argument depends in the end on a rejection of this 
"powerful" argument. While I have not been convinced by Professor Bradley's argument, I 
do find it far more plausible than Yoo's position on self-execution. 
247. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
248. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2251. 
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to evaluate this argument because the Court at the time had not yet con-
strued the scope of the Commerce Power. What is most telling about 
Ware is that the Court saw no need to consider the scope of the Com-
merce Power before giving self-executing effect to the treaty. Yoo in the 
end recognizes that his hard rule is inconsistent with judicial doctrine,249 
and for this reason he proffers in the alternative a softer rule, under 
which treaties that fall within the Article I power are self-executing only if 
the treatymakers attach a clear statement that they are self-executing.250 
Yoo recognizes that there are numerous Supreme Court cases in which 
treaties were given effect even though there was neither implementing 
legislation nor a clear statement of self-execution, but he argnes that 
some of them are consistent with his theory because they addressed mat-
ters beyond the scope of Article I.251 He includes in this category the 
many cases giving effect to the Warsaw Convention. 252 The claim that a 
treaty addressing the liability of foreign and domestic air carriers falls 
outside the scope of the foreign commerce clause is mystifYing. Even 
though there admittedly were no air carriers at the time of the framing, I 
doubt that any Justice would say that a regulation of such carriers falls 
within the exclusive legislative power of the states. In any event, Yoo 
makes no attempt to square his theory with the many other Supreme 
Court decisions that conflict with it.253 
Yoo also relies heavily on the Executive's recent practice of attaching 
non-self-execution declarations to treaties.254 The meaning and effect of 
such declarations has yet to be addressed by the Court, but, more impor-
tantly for present purposes, the practice of attaching such declarations to 
treaties is fully consistent with the rule I defend-that treaties are pre-
sumptively self-executing. Yoo claims that these declarations "may have 
signaled the political branches' agreement that non-self-execution should 
become the general rule applied to all treaties."255 Even assuming such a 
view were relevant to a constitutional interpretation,256 it is hard to see 
249. See id. at 2254-55. 
250. See id. at 2220. 
251. See id. at 2254 n.138. 
252. See id. 
253. None of the cases cited supra note 147 involved treaties that included anything 
resembling the sort of clear statement Professor Yoo would require. 
254. See Yoo, Treaties and Public lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2256-57. 
255. 1d. at 2257. 
256. Cf. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 408 
(1990), in which the Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that an executive branch 
statement on a legal question implicating foreign affairs was not binding on the courts. In 
Kirkpatrick , the Court narrowed the Act-of-State Doctrine on the basis of the principle that 
"Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases 
and controversies properly presented to them." ld. at 409. Yoo notes that "a non-self-
execution rule ... is consistent with other developments in foreign relations law that have 
sought to limit judicial discretion in areas such as the act of state doctrine, the political 
question doctrine, and donnant preemption." Yoo, Treaties and Public lawmaking, supra 
note 3, at 2256. That may be so, but, as Kirkpatrick shows, judicial discretion can be limited 
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how the declarations reflect such a view. If the political branches had 
embraced Yoo's position, they would have regarded such declarations as 
superfluous. 
Professor Yoo also makes a number of broad separation of powers 
arguments, many of them relying on the political question doctrine. I 
completely agree that the non-self-execution concept has strong affinities 
with the political question doctrine. Indeed, I regard the former doc-
trine as the treaty-law counterpart to the latter. One point of my earlier 
writings has been that the political question doctrine, as applied to consti-
tutional and statutory norms, is extremely narrow, and that the corre-
sponding doctrine for treaties should be equally narrow.257 Yoo proposes 
a radically different abstention rule with respect to treaties, but he paints 
with too broad a brush. He relies on cases that he reads to require judi-
cial deference to the other branches in matters that implicate foreign 
affairs, but these cases either did not involve treaties and have no implica-
tions for the self-execution question,258 or merely affirmed that treaties 
can be trumped by later legislation,259 or are othenvise inapposite.260 By 
contrast, when the Court has been urged by the Executive to reject treaty-
based claims on non-self-execution (or related lack-of-standing) grounds, 
it has declined to do so.261 If the decisions Yoo cites did suggest that 
courts must avoid adjudicating cases based on treaties, they would be vul-
nerable to a powerful objection based on the text of the Constitution, 
which explicitly instructs judges to give effect to treaties. But they do not. 
What is most noteworthy about the Supreme Court's decisions is that the 
Court has only once unambiguously denied relief on the ground that the 
treaty at issue was non-self-executing, and it later found even that treaty to 
be self-executing.262 
by expanding the judicial role as well as by contracting it. Thus, the trend of diminishing 
judicial discretion in the foreign affairs area is as consistent with the traditional rule as with 
the one Yoo advocates-indeed, more so, in light of Kirkpatrick. 
257. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 716. For elaboration, see Vazquez, 
Constitution as Law of the Land, supra note 88; see also DavidJ. Bederman, Deference or 
Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1439, 1441 (1999) 
(arguing that "the 'pure' form of the political question doctrine is largely out of favor 
today in the Supreme Court, even with respect to foreign affairs controversies"). 
258. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2247-48 (relying on 
Baker v. Carr and Curlw-Wright). 
259. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1969-71 (relying on the Head Money Cases 
and Whitney v. Rnbcrtson). 
260. Some of the cases Yoo relies on are lower court decisions, and others plurality 
opinions. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2247 (citing Goldwater 
v. Carter and lower court cases dismissing challenges to the Vietnam War). 
261. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 143. 
262. See supra text accompanying notes 106-112; see also Vazquez, Four Doctrines, 
supra note 8, at 716 & n.96. 
ProfessorYoo cites a number oflower court decisions in support of various aspects of 
his thesis, including most notably Judge Bark's sole concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J. concurring). See Yoo, 
Globalism, supra note 1, at 1973 n.82. But as he himself admits, the lower courts are 
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Finally, Professor Yoo makes policy arguments in favor of his consti-
tutional interpretation that belong instead in an article urging a constitu-
tional amendment. For example, he says that I "argue that the House is 
ill-suited for the secrecy needed for diplomacy. "263 I actually did not ex-
press a view on that point; I merely noted that the Founders held that 
view·.264 Yoo's argument that this view is no longer tenable265 makes it 
manifest that his beef is with the arrangement the Constitution estab-
lishes, not anyone's interpretation of it. If he is right that the House is no 
longer ill-suited for the secrecy needed for diplomacy, that would be a 
reason to reject the Framers' decision to deny the House a role in the 
making of treaties.266 But it would not be a reason to deny treaties that 
are already in force the status of domestic law. Even less would it be a 
avowedly confused by the self-execution doctrine. See id. at 1958. I attempt to show in 
"Four Doctrines" that most of the lower court decisions are consistent with my view. See 
Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8. In any event, while constitutional text perhaps may 
yield to Supreme Court decisions, it cannot in my view yield to lower court decisions, 
particularly confusing or ambiguous lower court decisions that conflict with other lower 
court decisions. 
Yoo argues that the APA and section 1983 do not confer a right of action for violations 
of treaties, as they only apply to violations of federal "law." See Yoo, Treaties and Public 
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2256 n.140. Here, as elsewhere, he overlooks that treaties are 
law. On the applicability of the APA and section 1983 to treaties, see generally Vazquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1143-57. Congress knows how to exclude treaty 
claims from its remedial statutes when it wants to. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). Yoo 
is on firmer ground when he notes, somewhat inconsistently, that, because treaties are law, 
the conclusion that appropriations require House action is unsupported by the 
constitutional provision that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Yoo, 
Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2236 n.61. But the need for House action 
derives indirect textual support from the related Origination Clause. U.S. Const., art. I, 
§ 7, cl. 1. In any event, the requirement of House action for appropriations and for other 
limited purposes does not support the claim that House action is necessary to accomplish 
anything falling within the scope of Article I. 
Yoo also cites the APA in support of the proposition that treaties should generally be 
unenforceable in courts, noting that "[a)dministrative law schemes recognize that certain 
federal mandates are to be enforced by the executive branch, rather than by Congress or 
the courts." Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2244-45. But the APA 
actually supports a presumption of judicial enforceability. As the Court noted in the case 
Yoo cites, there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review, a presumption that can 
be overcome only by "clear and convincing evidence of a legislative intent to restrict access 
to judicial review." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Yoo, Treaties and Public 
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2245 n.97. The exception for action "committed to agency 
discretion," moreover, is "very narrow" and covers cases in which there is "no law to apply." 
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because 
treaties are "law," the analogy Yoo draws would appear to be inapt. 
263. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2241. 
264. Indeed, I merely quoted his statement that the Founders held that view. See 
supra note 22 (citingYoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2036). 
265. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2241. 
266. Arguably we have already done this through an informal constitutional 
amendment. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 241. 
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reason to interpret the existing Constitution as denying treaties the status 
of domestic law. To read the Supremacy Clause that way would be to 
display the same cavalier attitude towards the Constitution that Professor 
Yoo claims the Framers took towards treaties. He is mistaken when he 
claims that the Framers thought it acceptable to laugh at treaties, and he 
is mistaken when he claims that constitutional text, doctrine, and struc-
ture tolerate it. 
